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Establishing the importance of marketing at the corporate strategy level in 
enhancing firm strategic outcomes, in particular, firm value, is critical to the 
advancement of the marketing profession. In this research, I investigate the main effects 
of the CEO’s marketing experience on firm strategic outcomes (marketing and R&D 
intensity, and firm value), as well as its moderating effect on these outcomes when 
activist investors intervene to influence management decisions in a firm.  
The first essay focuses on how CEO's marketing experience impacts innovation, 
marketing intensity, and firm value and on how these relationships are moderated by the 
CEO's ownership of the firm and by industry competition. Using motivation and agency 
theories, I develop a conceptual framework and hypotheses related to these important 
research questions and test them using a uniquely assembled panel dataset of 152 U.S. 
publicly traded firms over 10 years. The results reveal that the CEO’s marketing 
experience has both direct and indirect (through R&D intensity, marketing intensity, and 
the number of patents and trademarks) positive effects on firm value. These effects are 
weakened when the CEO’s ownership of the firm is high and are strengthened when 
industry competition is intense. 
The second essay focuses on the effects of activist investor intervention on 
marketing and R&D intensity, and firm value, and the moderating role of the CEO’s 
marketing experience in these effects. I use a sample of 455 firms targeted by activist 




intervention on marketing intensity, R&D intensity, and firm value through a 
differences-in-differences (DIFF-IN-DIFF) approach. The results suggest that activist 
investor intervention has a detrimental effect on not just marketing spending but also on 
innovation and firm value, but importantly, CEOs with marketing experience can 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION  
 
Marketing academics and practitioners are increasingly concerned about 
marketing’s diminishing influence on corporate strategy, the top management team, and 
the boardroom. Previous research has examined the impact of the Chief Marketing 
Officer’s (CMO’s) presence in the C-Suite, marketing department power, and board-
level marketing experience on firm performance. However, the influence of the Chief 
Executive Officer’s (CEO’s) marketing experience on strategic firm outcomes (R&D 
spending, marketing spending, and firm value) has been underexplored. Examining the 
effects of the CEO’s marketing experience on firm outcomes can address the critical role 
of marketing at the topmost level. 
The CEO’s functional background and experience come into play when CEOs 
face competing claims for their attention (e.g., Hambrick and Abrahamson 1995) or 
when some shareholders urge them to cut expenditures (Cohn and Rajan 2013). In recent 
years, the number of shareholder activism campaigns has increased hyperbolically. 
Critics of activist investors contend that activist investors pressure managers to make 
decisions that sacrifice long-term financial goals for short-term gains (e.g., Bebchuk et 
al. 2015). Cutting marketing and R&D expenditures of the firm can be one of the major 
topics in activist investors’ agendas. According to prior research, marketing is treated as 
discretionary, and expenditures related to marketing are among the first set of expenses 




et al. 2005). Therefore, activist investor intervention can further deteriorate the 
conditions for marketers. However, little is known about the effects of activist investor 
intervention on marketing spending of the firm and how the CEO’s marketing 
experience might play a role in these effects. 
In this dissertation, I study the role of the CEO’s marketing experience on firm 
strategic outcomes. In particular, I investigate (1) the main effects of the CEO’s 
marketing experience on firm marketing and R&D intensity, and firm value, and (2) the 
moderating role of the CEO’s marketing experience on these outcomes, when activist 
investors intervene in a firm.  
In the first essay, I focus on the main effects of the CEO’s marketing experience 
and address the following research questions: (1) What are the effects of the CEO’s 
marketing experience on innovation, marketing intensity, and firm value? (2) What are 
the roles of internal (CEO’s ownership in the firm) and external (industry competition) 
motivators in these effects? Using motivation and agency theories, I develop a 
conceptual framework and hypotheses related to these important research questions and 
test them using a uniquely assembled panel dataset of 152 United States (U.S.) publicly 
traded firms over 10 years.  
In the second essay, I investigate the effects of activist investor intervention on 
firm strategic outcomes, and the moderating role of the CEO’s marketing experience in 
these effects. In particular, I try to address the following research questions: (1) What are 
the main effects of activist investor intervention on marketing intensity, innovation 




these effects? To answer these questions, I analyze a uniquely assembled panel dataset 
comprising 455 firms that activist investors targeted during 2010-2015. I control for the 























CHAPTER II  
CEO’S MARKETING EXPERIENCE AND FIRM VALUE 
 
Marketing academics and practitioners are increasingly concerned about 
marketing’s diminishing influence on corporate strategy, the top management team, and 
the boardroom. While previous research has examined the impact of the Chief Marketing 
Officer’s (CMO’s) presence in the C-Suite, the marketing department’s power, and 
board-level marketing experience on firm performance, the influence of the Chief 
Executive Officer’s (CEO’s) marketing experience on firm value has been 
underexplored.  
I develop a conceptual model comprising both direct and indirect (through R&D 
intensity, marketing intensity, and the number of patents and trademarks) effects of the 
CEO’s marketing experience on firm value. Using motivation and agency theories, I 
postulate that the CEO’s marketing experience has a direct positive effect on firm value 
and that its positive effect on marketing intensity and R&D intensity is diminished with 
greater CEO ownership in the firm and enhanced under intense industry competition.  
I test these hypotheses by estimating a system of equations on a uniquely 
assembled panel dataset of 152 U.S. publicly traded firms over 10 years, using a 
seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) approach. The results reveal that the CEO’s 
marketing experience has both direct and indirect (through R&D intensity, marketing 
intensity, and the number of patents and trademarks) positive effects on firm value. The 




firm strategies and outcomes. The findings suggest that firms should consider hiring and 




The impact of a firm’s top management on firm outcomes is a topic of 
considerable interest to scholars and practitioners (e.g., Hambrick and Quigley 2014: 
Moorman and Rust 1999; Quigley and Hambrick 2015; Shen and Cannella 2002). The 
effects of upper-echelon management characteristics such as education and functional 
background on firm outcomes are important to researchers and managers. Because the 
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the manager with the highest executive power, a 
growing body of research explores how CEOs’ attributes shape their decisions and how 
these decisions impact stakeholder outcomes based on upper-echelon theory (e.g., 
Barker and Mueller 2002; Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Hambrick and Mason 1984; 
Rodenbach and Brettel 2012).  
According to upper-echelon theory (Hambrick and Mason 1984), managers’ 
functional background can influence their strategic choices. Nonetheless, literature 
focusing on the impact of the CEO’s functional background, in particular, marketing 
background, on firm outcomes, in particular, firm value, is slim with substantial 
limitations (e.g., Barker and Mueller 2002; Pasa and Shugan 1996; Warren, Sorescu, and 
Srinivasan 2018; Zhang and Wiersema 2009). Studying the impact of the CEO’s 




practitioners to enable them uncover the influence of marketing on corporate strategy 
and firm value.  
Research on the status of marketing suggests that marketing’s strategic role is 
unclear (e.g., Verhoef and Leeflang 2009). Marketing scholars have lamented the fading 
of marketing influence on corporate strategy (e.g., Anderson 1982; Kumar and Shah 
2009; Moorman and Rust 1999; Webster, Malter, and Ganesan 2005; Wind and 
Robertson 1983). Uncertainty surrounds the role of the top marketing executives in firms 
and could lead some CEOs to conclude that marketing does not deserve a formal place at 
the corporate table (Boyd, Chandy, and Cunha 2010). Such a conclusion could 
potentially harm marketing’s strategic influence within firms and make it difficult for 
managers to acquire the resources needed to carry out marketing activities. Indeed, 
marketing leaders hold less than one percent of the board seats of Fortune 1000 firms 
(Daum and Welch 2013). However, three of the top five challenges boards face are 
marketing-related: customer relationships, innovation, and corporate brand reputation 
(Burn-Murdoch, Bernard, and Hill 2014; Whitler, Krause, and Lehmann 2018). 
Prior research on the strategic role of marketing in firms presents mixed results. 
The Chief Marketing Officer’s (CMO’s) presence in the top management team (TMT) 
and its impact on firm performance have been commonly studied to examine the 
strategic role of marketing. However, the findings from research are inconsistent 
(Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal 2015; Nath and Mahajan 2008; 2011). While Nath and 
Mahajan (2008) find no significant impact of the CMO’s presence in TMT on firm 




reason for the inconsistent findings is the instability of CMOs in firms; the CMO is the 
most frequently fired C-level executive with an average tenure of less than 24 months 
(Welch 2004). Therefore, the CMO’s long-term contribution to firm-level outcomes is 
difficult to study.  
Examining the CEO’ marketing experience can potentially resolve the conflicting 
findings from prior research. This is because attrition concerns are attenuated for CEOs 
relative to CMOs. On average, CEOs have longer tenure and greater executive power 
than CMOs and have an overarching strategic responsibility (McGovern et al. 2004). In 
addition, CEOs have a significant impact on firm-level outcomes (Hambrick and 
Quigley 2014; Mackey 2008; Quigley and Hambrick 2015).  
The CEO’s experience can significantly shape strategy. Professional experience 
influences a manager’s cognitive base, which in turn, can drive organizational outcomes 
(Hambrick and Mason 1984). The experience that a manager brings to any 
administrative situation shapes his/her mental model and closely affects his/her 
perceptions, interpretations, and strategic choices (Kish-Gephart and Campbell 2015). 
Thus, experience is an important driver of a manager’s actions (Perkins and Rao 1990). 
Little wonder, companies led by CEOs with strong marketing orientation tend to retain 
the responsibility for marketing strategy at the corporate level (Webster, Malter, and 
Ganesan 2003).  
A firm’s emphasis on marketing can manifest through expenditures on R&D 
(Research and Development) and marketing, and outcomes such as sales revenues, profit 




these critical firm-level outcomes and their interrelationships has been underexplored. 
Furthermore, the effects of the CEO’s marketing experience on innovation and 
marketing intensity could depend on internal motivators such as the CEO’s financial 
stake in the firm, and external motivators such as industry competition. 
In this research, I address the following critical questions: (1) What are the 
effects of the CEO’s marketing experience on innovation, marketing intensity, and firm 
value? (2) What are the roles of internal (CEO’s ownership of the firm) and external 
(industry competition) motivators in these effects? To answer these questions, I develop 
hypotheses using motivation and agency theories and assemble and analyze a unique 
panel data set comprising 152 United States (U.S.) publicly traded firms in the Fortune 
1000 list with data on their CEOs’ demographics and employment history from 2006 to 
2015 and variables such as R&D spending, marketing spending, and firm value.  
The results show that the CEO’s marketing experience has a positive direct 
impact on firm value. Importantly, it has indirect effects through R&D and marketing 
intensities. These effects are muted when the CEO’s ownership in the firm is high and 
amplified when industry competition is intense.  
This essay makes three important contributions. First, by analyzing the impact of 
the CEO’s marketing experience on firm outcomes, in particular, firm value, it addresses 
the critical role of marketing at the topmost level, extending Verhoef and Leeflang 
(2009). While most previous research focuses on the CMO’s presence in TMT as 
representative of marketing at the corporate level (e.g., Boyd, Chandy, and Cunha 2010; 




department power (Feng, Morgan, and Rego 2015), my research directly addresses 
marketing’s role at the level of the CEO, the most powerful strategic actor in the TMT.  
Second, by studying both the direct and indirect effects of the CEO’s marketing 
experience on different firm outcomes, this research addresses crucial budget allocation 
decisions. The CEO’s marketing experience and its relationship with R&D and 
marketing intensities have received scant attention. My results show that the CEO’s 
marketing experience has indirect effects on firm value through R&D and marketing 
intensities. My research complements Warren, Sorescu, and Srinivasan (2018) who 
study the effects of the appointment of CEOs with marketing experience on innovation.  
Third, my research contributes to upper-echelon theory by proposing and testing 
contingencies (CEO ownership in the firm, industry competition) under which the 
impact of the CEO’s marketing experience on strategic activities is affected. It extends 
prior research on the CEO’s functional background and firm outcomes in general (e.g., 
Barker and Mueller 2002; Hambrick and Quigley 2014; Jensen and Zajac 2004) to the 
effects of the CEO’s marketing experience on firm value. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
The issue of top executives’ influence on organizational performance is 
important for academics and managers alike (Bertrand and Schoar 2003; Mackey 2008). 
Managers vary in their effectiveness that has key firm-level consequences (Hambrick 
and Quigley 2014). This premise is pronounced in the case of CEOs who are in a 




Shugan 1996; Webster 1988). CEOs view business situations based on their functional 
background and experience that affect strategic firm activities and outcomes.  
The CEO’s functional background and experience come into play when CEOs 
face competing claims for their attention (Hambrick and Abrahamson 1995; Yadav, 
Prabhu, and Chandy 2007). In general, the functional experience of executives has 
important implications for their knowledge base, skills, and cognitive orientation 
(Rodenbach and Brettel 2012). Experience in a particular functional area causes 
managers to perceive and interpret information in ways suited to their functional area 
(Dearborn and Simon 1958). Furthermore, managers have their own “styles” when 
making investment, resource allocation, and other strategic decisions (Bertrand and 
Schoar 2003).  
Of special interest is the CEO’s marketing experience because it is directly 
related to firm growth (Whitler et al. 2018). CEOs with marketing and R&D/engineering 
experience favor innovation strategies to forge ahead and emphasize growth by 
launching new products and entering new markets (Barker and Mueller 2002; 
Finkelstein and Hambrick 1996; Warren et al. 2018). 
The CEO’s marketing experience is especially interesting to study given that the 
role of marketing is dwindling at the strategic level of firms (e.g., Moorman 2014; 
Schultz 2003), and proving the value of marketing at the corporate strategy level is a 
challenge (Boyd, Chandy, and Cunha 2010; Nath and Mahajan 2008; 2011). The CMO’s 
presence in the TMT is a common measure to gauge marketing’s influence at the top, 




tenure (Welch 2004) and lack overarching strategic responsibilities (McGovern et al. 
2004). Furthermore, even as companies are becoming more market-oriented, the CMO’s 
power does not seem to be increasing (Lamberti and Noci 2009). 
While the results about the CMO’s power have been discouraging, the marketing 
department power (Feng, Morgan, and Rego 2015) and board-level marketing 
experience (Whitler, Krause, and Lehmann 2018) are positively associated with firm 
performance. However, we do not know much about the role of the CEO’s marketing 
experience in creating and enhancing firm value. In management research, while one 
stream suggests that the CEO can have a significant impact on firm performance (e.g., 
Hambrick, and Quigley 2014), another stream does not consider the CEO to be able to 
significantly change firm behavior (e.g., Haveman 1993). Furthermore, the limited 
research on the role of the CEO’s marketing experience does not examine its direct 
effects on firm value.   
I integrate research from the marketing and management disciplines to explore 
both the direct and the indirect effects of the CEO’s marketing experience on firm’s 
strategic activities and firm value. Table 1 shows how my research extends related 
literature. I investigate how the CEO’s marketing experience influences innovation, 
marketing intensity, and how it impacts firm value directly and indirectly through 
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CEO’s Marketing Experience, Innovation, Marketing Intensity, and Firm Value 
Marketing expertise is important for firms (Pasa and Shugan 1996) and it 
contributes to innovation and strategic decisions (Houston 1986). The CEO plays a 
critical role in the success of a firm’s marketing strategy (Webster 1988) and exemplifies 
the firm’s orientation. The CEO's professional background is a measure of both the 
CEO’s expertise and the firm’s emphasis on areas of expertise (Pasa and Shugan 1996). 
Experience is a critical contributor to knowledge marked by expertise, supporting high-
quality decision-making (McDonald, Westphal, and Graebner 2008; Perkins and Rao 
1990). Professional experience influences executives’ strategic decisions because 
executives tend to identify and define business problems and solutions in terms of their 
functional background (Dearborn and Simon 1958). Therefore, the CEO’s marketing 
experience is likely to impact the firm’s innovation and marketing activities, outputs, 
and firm value. 
Innovation 
Innovation plays a critical role in firm survival and success. R&D expenditures 
can be regarded as a key indicator of a firm’s investment in innovation (Barker and 
Mueller 2002; Hall, Jaffe, and Trajtenberg 2005). A firm’s R&D spending also reflects 
how much its corporate strategy embraces innovation. CEOs with different functional 
backgrounds and experiences may have different attitudes toward R&D investment. 
Engineers and marketers typically care deeply about innovation because engineers tend 
to make and manufacture new products and marketers view innovation as a solution to 




Mueller 2002). Therefore, firms with CEOs from marketing or engineering background 
will likely outspend CEOs with other functional backgrounds on R&D. CEOs with 
extensive marketing experience will likely focus more on spending on R&D and creating 
more patents and trademarks than CEOs with limited marketing experience. This 
reasoning leads to my first hypothesis. 
H1: The CEO’s marketing experience is positively associated with firm 
innovation. 
 
Marketing Intensity   
Spending on marketing-related activities has a positive effect on firm 
performance (e.g., McAlister, Srinivasan, and Kim 2007). Marketing spending in the 
form of advertising or sales expenditures has a direct effect on various firm performance 
metrics, including sales and profit (Erickson and Jacobson 1992), and firm value (Joshi 
and Hanssens 2004). Firms’ advertising efforts create brand equity which helps 
differentiate a firm’s products (Kirmani and Zeithaml 1993) and make them less easily 
substitutable (Mela, Gupta, and Lehmann 1997). Increased brand equity also raises price 
premiums (Ailawadi, Lehmann, and Neslin 2003) and lowers price sensitivities (Kaul 
and Wittink 1995). Therefore, the role of the CEO’s marketing experience in marketing-
related expenditures is important to study.  
When formulating strategies for advertising, sales, and other marketing-related 
activities, a firm’s utilization of its marketing expertise is critical (Pasa and Shugan 
1996). I expect CEOs with higher marketing experience to pay greater attention to the 
marketing department and its expenditures as their experience can be very valuable in 




CEO’s marketing experience has a positive impact on marketing intensity. Specifically, I 
propose the CEO’s marketing experience positively affects both advertising intensity 
and sales intensity. These arguments lead to H2.  
H2: The CEO’s marketing experience is positively associated with the marketing 
intensity of the firm. 
 
Firm Value 
The CEO’s marketing experience can directly affect the value of the firm. 
Investors use observable background characteristics of top executives of firms as signals 
to infer the quality of the firms (Zhang and Wiersema 2009). The characteristics of 
TMT, the structure of the board, and the CEO’s characteristics such as shareholding and 
external directorships provide signals of firm quality that influence the market valuation 
of the firms (Higgins and Gulati 2006; Lester et al. 2006; Zhang and Wiersema 2009). In 
addition to the direct influence they have on the processes and outcomes of the firm, top 
executives fulfill a symbolic role with the firm’s external constituents such as 
shareholders, signaling their strategic intent (Lester et al. 2006). A key characteristic 
affecting the CEO’s decisions and firm outcomes is the CEO’s functional background 
and experience (Hambrick and Mason 1984).  
The CEO’s marketing experience can signal how the firm will create value for its 
customers and shareholders. Investors view the CEO’s functional area experience as an 
indicator of how the CEO might go about creating value for customers and themselves. 
CEOs with marketing experience recognize the importance of the customer’s voice in 
the development of new offerings (Webster, Malter, and Ganesan 2005). Understanding 




profit (Perkins and Rao 1990). While market information is available to all firms, each 
firm uses the available information uniquely (Zaltman and Moorman 1989). A CEO with 
high marketing experience can utilize market information effectively to create high value 
for customers. Value creation is a cornerstone of marketing; the marketing concept 
identifies the customer as the primary focus, and without creating superior customer 
value, it is infeasible for organizations to create a competitive advantage (Mizik and 
Jacobson 2003). Marketing activities can drive growth only when they are aligned with 
corporate strategy (McGovern et al. 2004). CEOs with extensive marketing experience 
can better align marketing activities with corporate strategy than CEOs with limited 
marketing experience. In addition, CEOs with greater marketing experience may more 
appropriately allocate budgets to marketing-related expenditures than other CEOs. 
Indeed, board members with marketing experience significantly impact firm growth 
(Whitler, Krause, and Lehmann 2018). Therefore, I expect CEOs with greater marketing 
experience to enhance customer and firm values. Thus, I formulate the following 
hypothesis. 
H3: The CEO’s marketing experience is positively associated with firm value. 
Moderators and Interactions 
The effects of the CEO’s functional experience on firm activities and outcomes 
may depend on the CEO’s motivation. The stronger the CEO’s motivation to act in the 
firm’s long-term interests, the more positive the firm’s outcomes are. Motivation theory 
has long been used by organizational behavior and management scholars and 




Cole 1987). Like any manager, the CEO’s motivation to apply his/her expertise can be 
internal or external to the firm. Internal motivation will likely be best triggered by the 
question: “What is in it for me?” The part of the CEO’s financial compensation that is 
aligned with firm value best captures this internal motivation factor. In contrast, external 
motivation is likely driven by outside pressures to perform. Industry competition is an 
excellent indicator of this motivation factor. Indeed, the roles of compensation and 
competition in motivating employees and managers have attracted significant attention 
from scholars in management and organizational behavior (e.g., Mehran 1995).    
CEO’s Ownership in the Firm 
Tying managers’ compensation to firm performance can motivate managers to 
apply their expertise to make riskier decisions for shareholder value-maximizing 
decisions (Mehran 1995). When managers own a greater proportion of stocks in the 
firms they manage, they are more motivated to make decisions that help the firm in the 
long-term.  
The CEO’s ownership in the firm creates two roles for the CEO, namely, a 
stockholder and a manager. The relationship between the stockholders (principal) and 
the manager (agent) of a corporation can be viewed as an agency relationship (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). Agency theory is concerned with resolving two problems that can 
occur in agency relationships. The first is the problem that arises when (a) the desires or 
goals of the principal and agent conflict and (b) it is difficult or expensive for the 
principal to verify what the agent is actually doing. The second is the problem of risk 




toward risk and engage in different actions (Eisenhardt 1989). Shareholders want the 
CEO to take actions based on whether the expected return exceeds the expected costs for 
the firm. But the CEO primarily considers his/her private gain and the cost from 
pursuing a particular activity (Jensen and Murphy 1990). CEOs often face short-term 
earnings pressure, declining demand, suboptimal economic conditions, and the prospect 
of limited tenure (Currim, Lim, and Kim 2012).  
In general, CEOs, like most managers, are risk-averse. To reduce their 
compensation risk, managers may apply their experience toward activities that reduce 
firm risk even when such activities can adversely affect shareholders’ wealth in the long-
run (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  
R&D and advertising spending typically benefit the firm in the long-term and 
shareholders expect CEOs to allocate more of their budgets to these expenditures for 
long-term growth. However, because the long-term benefits of these expenditures are 
uncertain, CEOs may be reluctant to spend high amounts on R&D and advertising. As a 
manager, the CEO is risk-averse and may cut these expenditures to improve earnings in 
the short-term, even if such cuts may reduce stock return in the long-term (e.g., Currim, 
Lim, and Kim 2012; Mizik and Jacobson 2003). 
However, CEOs are heterogeneous in risk aversion based on their marketing 
experience. CEOs with high levels of marketing experience can play a significant role in 
innovation and marketing expenditures (Barker and Mueller 2002; Pasa and Shugan 
1996). For instance, in the computer industry, Thomas et al. (1991) observed that firms 




spending, were often headed by CEOs with relevant functional expertise (i.e., marketing, 
sales, R&D). Because R&D investment and marketing expenditures are considered risky 
activities and because their results typically materialize in the long run, it can be argued 
that CEOs with greater marketing experience are more willing to take risks and are more 
long-term oriented than other CEOs.   
Agency theorists have proposed several ways to align the CEO’s interests with 
those of the shareholders. As Hall and Liebman (1998) observe “the most direct solution 
to the agency problem is to align the incentives of executives with the interests of 
shareholders by granting (or selling) stock and stock options to the CEO.” Stock 
ownership is a compensation mechanism that aligns an executive’s welfare directly with 
the firm’s performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990). Stock grants are typically realized 
over a long horizon through vesting periods. Stock ownership links the agent’s (the 
CEO’s) financial outcomes with those of the principal (shareholders), motivating an 
agent to direct his/her attention, preferences, and efforts toward actions that benefit the 
principal in the long-term (Nyberg et al. 2010). Owning stocks in the firm makes the 
CEO more sensitive to stock value. The greater the sensitivity of CEOs to stock value, 
the harder they work to increase the long-term value of firms because they share the 
gains and losses of the shareholders (Currim, Lim, and Kim 2012). For instance, 
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) show that managers who receive more stock option 
compensation in the oil and gas industry invest more in risky projects, such as R&D 




Based on this reasoning, it can be argued that when the CEO’s ownership in the 
firm is high, he/she will not be as risk averse as when the CEO’s ownership is low. 
Moreover, with greater ownership, the CEO will be more willing to make decisions that 
impact the firm’s future earnings rather than focusing on the firm’s short-term earnings. 
Thus, enhanced ownership in the firm motivates even CEOs with limited marketing 
experience to spend on risky activities and projects, such as R&D and advertising, 
potentially influencing future earnings. Furthermore, ownership in the firm minimizes 
the differences in R&D and marketing spending among CEOs with varying levels of 
marketing experience. Therefore, when the CEO’s ownership in the firm is higher, the 
positive effect of the CEO’s marketing experience on innovation and marketing intensity 
would be weaker. Thus, I advance the following hypotheses. 
H4a: The CEO’s ownership in the firm weakens the positive relationship between 
the CEO’s marketing experience and innovation. 
H4b: The CEO’s ownership in the firm weakens the positive relationship between 
the CEO’s marketing experience and marketing intensity. 
 
Industry Competition/Concentration 
Industry competition can significantly influence the effect of the CEO’s 
marketing experience on firm outcomes. The industry’s structural characteristics can act 
as motivators in the utilization of a manager’s experience toward firm outcomes 
(Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987). Markets with few competitors typically have strict 
rules or norms that can limit a manager’s competitive pressure. In addition, when the 
fear of losing the market is low, managers are less motivated to apply their experience 
for desirable outcomes. In contrast, when competition is high, the motivation to 




outcomes (Hambrick and Finkelstein 1987; Li and Tang 2010). Therefore, industry 
competition can work as an external motivator for the utilization of the CEO’s marketing 
experience toward firm outcomes. 
Industry concentration reflects industry competition. CEOs with greater 
marketing experience are inclined to spend more on innovation and marketing-related 
activities. In industries characterized by low concentration or intense competition, the 
CEO’s marketing expertise can be applied to help the firm cope with competition 
(Homburg et al. 2014). In less-concentrated industries marked by fierce competition, 
CEOs might utilize their marketing experience to be aggressive with R&D investment 
and advertising. Industry competition can help amplify the use of marketing experience 
in functional areas, such as marketing, sales, merchandising, entrepreneurship, and 
product research and development (Chaganti and Sambyhara 1987; Thomas et al. 1991). 
Therefore, I expect that under more intense competition, CEOs with greater marketing 
experience will outspend those with lesser marketing experience on innovation and 
marketing-related activities. Thus, I hypothesize that:  
H5a: Industry concentration weakens the positive relationship between the CEO’s 
marketing experience and innovation. 
H5b: Industry concentration weakens the positive relationship between the CEO’s 
marketing experience and marketing intensity. 
 
The conceptual model comprising the relationships among the constructs as well 
as the hypotheses appears in Figure 1. The CEO’s marketing experience has both direct 








DATA AND VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION 
To test the hypotheses, I need panel data with firm-level, market-level, and CEO-
level data. Because no single database contains all these data, I had to assemble a unique 
data set from multiple sources, such as BoardEx, Bloomberg Businessweek, LinkedIn, 
COMPUSTAT, EXECUCOMP, SEC EDGAR, Hoover’s Premium, and company 
websites. An advantage of this approach is that I avoid common method bias by using 
separate data sources for different variables (Mithas, Krishnan, and Fornell 2005). I 
FIGURE 1 






analyzed Fortune 1000 firms for which data on R&D, advertising, and SG&A (Selling, 
General and Administrative) expenditures were available in COMPUSTAT for at least 
four consecutive years. My sample consists of 152 firms with 267 CEOs over a 10-year 
period (2006-2015). The size of the sample is comparable to those of recent research in 
the area (e.g., Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal 2015). Table 2 provides a list of variables, 
their operationalization, and related data sources. 
CEO’s Marketing Experience 
I collected data on the CEO’s marketing experience from several sources. The 
main source is Boardex database available from WRDS. I searched the profiles of the 
CEOs of Fortune 1000 firms from 2006 to 2015 for marketing positions they had held in 
their career. A list of titles that reflect marketing responsibilities appears in Appendix 2. 
I included different levels of positions, low, mid, and senior. Prior research 
operationalizes the CEO’s marketing experience through a dummy variable representing 
marketing background (e.g., Barker and Mueller 2002; Pasa and Shugan 1996; 
Rodenbach and Brettel 2012; Whitler, Kraus, and Lehmann 2018). Such a measure does 
not account for the length of marketing experience. Nor does it account for marketing 









Variable Operationalization and Data Sources for Essay 1 
Variable Operationalization Source 
CEO’s Marketing 
Experience 
Years of CEO’s experience in marketing positions + (Years of experience as 
CEO × Ratio of marketing experience to total experience prior to being 
appointed as CEO) 
BoardEx, LinkedIn, 
Bloomberg, Equilar 
R&D Intensity Ratio of R&D expenditures to assets COMPUSTAT 
Patents Number of patents USPTO 
Trademarks Number of trademarks USPTO 
Advertising Intensity Ratio of advertising expenditures to assets COMPUSTAT 
SG&A Intensity Ratio of SG&A expenditures to assets COMPUSTAT 
CEO’s Engineering 
Experience 




Years of experience in functional areas other than marketing or engineering BoardEx, LinkedIn, 
Bloomberg, Equilar 
CEO’s Age CEO’s age BoardEx 
CEO’s Tenure Years as a CEO BoardEx 
CEO’s Experience 
within Firm 
Years of experience within the firm BoardEx 
CEO’s Total 
Experience 
Years of experience BoardEx, Bloomberg, 
Equilar 
CEO’s Duality Dummy variable that equals 1 if CEO is also the chairman; 0 otherwise BoardEx 
CEO’s Ownership 
Share 
Value of shares held by CEO at the end of the year in $ EXECUCOMP, SEC 
EDGAR 




Ratio of CEO compensation to TMT compensation EXECUCOMP, SEC 
EDGAR 
CEO’s Gender Dummy variable that equals 1 if CEO is male; 0 otherwise BoardEx 
CMO’s Presence in 
TMT 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if CMO is in TMT; 0 otherwise EXECUCOMP, SEC 
EDGAR 
COO’s Presence in 
TMT 
Dummy variable that equals 1 if COO is in TMT; 0 otherwise EXECUCOMP, SEC 
EDGAR 
Effort Intensity Ratio of cost of goods sold to revenues COMPUSTAT 
Financial Leverage Ratio of long-term debt to total assets COMPUSTAT 
Firm Age No. of years the firm is in business HOOVER 
Market Size Sales of all the firms in the same industry (SIC 2 digit) in $ COMPUSTAT 
Market Share Ratio of firm sales to market size (SIC 2 digit)  COMPUSTAT 
Market Growth Percentage of annual growth in market size COMPUSTAT 
Profit Firm profit in $ COMPUSTAT 
Revenue Firm revenues in $ COMPUSTAT 
Industry 
Concentration 
Herfindahl Hirschman index of the industry (SIC 2 digit) COMPUSTAT 
Organizational Slack Ratio of net cash flow from operational activities to total assets COMPUSTAT 
Marketing 
Department Power 
An index in the 1-100 range created from a PCA (Principal Component 
Analysis) of ratio of marketing executives to all executives in TMT, ratio of 
their compensation to all TMT compensation, hierarchical level of the 
highest-level marketing TMT executive’s job title, cumulative hierarchical 
level of all the marketing executives in the TMT, and number of 
responsibilities reflected in marketing TMT exec’s titles. 
EXECUCOMP- SEC 
EDGAR 




I operationalize the CEO’s marketing experience as the number of years of 
experience a CEO has had in marketing-related positions. These positions include CMO, 
VP of marketing, brand manager, advertising manager, chief merchandising officer, 
assistant to the advertising/brand manager, and VP of retail (see Appendix 2). The 
CEO’s marketing experience works as a knowledge base for the CEO, and he/she builds 
on this experience while working as a CEO, adding to the marketing experience he/she 
had prior to being appointed as the CEO. Therefore, to obtain the CEO’s marketing 
experience for the focal year, I add to the prior year’s marketing experience, the ratio of 
years in marketing positions to the total years of career experience prior to being 
appointed as the CEO. I cross-referenced the data with CEOs’ biographies available 
from other sources such as EQUILAR, Bloomberg Businessweek, LinkedIn, Boardroom 
insider, and company websites. 
Innovation 
For innovation or propensity to innovate, I use three different measures, R&D 
intensity, number of patents and number of trademarks, consistent with prior research 
(e.g., Hall, Jaffe, Trajtenberg 2005). I operationalize R&D intensity as the ratio of R&D 
expenditures to total assets (e.g., Dotzel, Shankar, and Berry 2013). 
Marketing Intensity 
For marketing intensity, I use two different variables, advertising intensity and 
SG&A intensity. Consistent with the literature, I operationalize advertising intensity as 
the ratio of advertising expenditures to total assets (e.g., Erickson and Jacobson 1992) 
and SG&A intensity as the ratio of SG&A expenditures to total assets (e.g., Fang, Lee, 





Consistent with prior research (e.g., Dotzel, Shankar, and Berry 2013; Germann, 
Ebbes, and Grewal 2015; Grewal, Chandrashekaran, and Citrin 2010), I use the Tobin’s 
q as a measure of firm value. It is a forward-looking measure based on stock price and 
captures long-term performance by comparing replacement and market values (Dotzel, 
Shankar, and Berry 2013). I compute Tobin’s q for each firm using its stock price and 
common shares outstanding at the end of the fiscal year.  
CEO’s Ownership in the Firm and Industry Concentration 
To measure the CEO’s ownership in the firm, consistent with prior research (e.g., 
Barker and Mueller 2002), I use the market value of all the shares held by the CEO at the 
end of the financial year. For industry concentration, consistent with the literature (e.g., 
Feng, Morgan, and Rego 2015). I use the Herfindahl-Hirschman index.  
Control Variables 
I control for the effects of other variables on my dependent variables based on 
prior research. These variables include: the CMO’s presence in TMT (Germann, Ebbes, 
and Grewal 2015), marketing department power (Feng, Morgan, and Rego 2015), the 
CEO’s age (Barker and Mueller 2002), the CEO’s total work experience (Brick, Palmon, 
and Wald 2006), the COO’s presence in TMT (Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal 2015), the 
CEO’s compensation ratio in TMT (Kashmiri and Mahajan 2017), market size (Dotzel, 
Shankar, and Berry 2013), market growth (Dotzel, Shankar, and Berry 2013), market 
share (Baker and Sinkula 2005), firm age, number of employees (Dotzel, Shankar, and 
Berry 2013), financial leverage, effort intensity, organizational slack (Dotzel, Shankar, 




revenues (Mithas, Krishnan, and Fornell 2005), and industry dummies to control for 
industry heterogeneity.  
The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix appear in Tables 3 and 4, 
respectively. The ranges of all the variables are reasonable. In addition, the correlations 
among the independent variables are low. Consistent with prior research (e.g., 
Kalaignanam, Shankar, and Varadarajan 2007), the variance inflation factors are below 
10, so multicollinearity is not an issue. 
 
TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Essay 1 
Notes: CEO’s marketing experience, CEO’s engineering experience, Patents, Trademarks, CEO’s other experiences, CEO’s age, 
CEO’s tenure, CEO’s experience within firm, CEO’s total experience, CEO’s ownership, CEO’s compensation, Firm age, Market 
size, Profit, Revenue, and Tobin’s q are measured in natural logarithm. Sample size = 1,031.
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
CEO’s Marketing Experience 1.06 1.09 1.08 0 3.60 
R&D Intensity .03 .01 .05 0 .29 
Patents 2.41 1.79 2.41 0 8.92 
Trademarks 2.15 2.30 1.42 0 6.39 
Advertising Intensity .03 0.02 .04 0 .41 
SG&A Intensity .30 0.26 .18 .02 1.02 
Tobin's q 1.12 1.07 .32 .44 2.34 
CEO’s Engineering Experience .44 0 .90 0 3.58 
CEO’s Other Experience 3.20 3.30 .46 .69 4.26 
CEO’s Age 4.03 4.04 .12 3.40 4.48 
CEO’s Tenure 1.70 1.79 .83 0 3.78 
CEO’s Experience within Firm 2.66 2.83 .81 0 3.87 
CEO’s Total Experience 3.43 3.46 .27 2.30 4.26 
CEO’s Duality .54 1 .50 0 1 
CEO’s Ownership Share 10.48 10.39 2.21 0 17.84 
CEO’s Compensation 8.96 9.13 1.25 .00 17.09 
CEO’s Compensation Ratio .38 .40 .13 0 .95 
CEO’s Gender .94 1 .23 0 1 
CMO’s Presence in TMT .38 0 .49 0 1 
COO’s Presence in TMT .55 1 .50 0 1 
Effort Intensity .57 .60 .20 .03 .92 
Financial Leverage .21 .20 .15 0 .87 
Firm Age 3.87 3.93 .87 0 5.34 
Market Size 13.19 13.63 .99 10.05 14.52 
Market Share .05 .02 .08 .000 .55 
Market Growth .02 .03 .09 -.26 .40 
Profit 5.99 6.33 2.37 0 10.88 
Revenue 9.19 9.03 1.20 6.02 13.09 
Industry Concentration .11 .05 .13 .02 .55 
Organizational Slack .13 .12 .07 -.24 .39 




Correlation Matrix for Essay 1 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 
1 CEO’s Marketing Experience 1.00 
                              
2 R&D Intensity .02 1.00 
                             
3 Patents .11 .52 1.00 
                            
4 Trademarks .21 .17 .40 1.00 
                           
5 Advertising Intensity .18 -.11 -.18 .20 1.00 
                          
6 SG&A Intensity .19 -.06 -.33 .05 .47 1.00 
                         
7 Tobin's q .17 .28 .14 .14 .14 .15 1.00 
                        
8 CEO’s Engineering Experience -.20 .42 .43 .08 -.19 -.15 .07 1.00 
                       
9 CEO’s Other Experience -.30 -.36 -.28 -.07 -.03 -.01 -.21 -.43 1.00 
                      
10 CEO’s Age -.07 -.23 -.08 -.03 -.03 -.09 -.19 -.11 .61 1.00 
                     
11 CEO’s Tenure -.03 .00 -.06 -.02 -.10 -.06 .10 .05 .28 .32 1.00 
                    
12 CEO’s Experience within Firm -.02 .03 .12 .15 -.10 -.14 .08 .09 .13 .18 .48 1.00 
                   
13 CEO’s Total Experience .01 -.21 -.05 .05 -.02 -.01 -.16 -.04 .70 .76 .34 .19 1.00 
                  
14 CEO’s Duality .00 -.17 -.05 .05 -.05 -.08 .00 -.10 .24 .25 .29 .22 .26 1.00 
                 
15 CEO’s Ownership Share -.03 .20 .14 .20 -.09 -.07 .29 .16 -.03 .02 .41 .37 .04 .18 1.00 
                
16 CEO’s Compensation .18 .01 .05 .06 .03 -.04 -.03 -.17 .13 .16 -.05 .02 .12 .11 -.07 1.00 
               
17 CEO’s Compensation Ratio .13 -.04 -.06 -.06 .01 .03 .01 -.10 .00 .03 .02 .01 -.02 .13 -.14 .49 1.00 
              
18 CEO’s Gender -.28 .10 -.01 -.06 -.03 -.09 -.06 .00 .16 .01 .07 .04 .03 .00 .03 -.13 -.07 1.00 
             
19 CMO’s Presence in TMT -.10 -.04 -.19 -.05 -.01 .22 .04 .00 .01 -.17 .06 -.03 -.06 -.03 .03 -.05 .02 .02 1.00 
            
20 COO’s Presence in TMT -.01 .00 -.10 -.07 .07 .07 .05 .01 .07 .05 .11 -.01 .05 .04 .01 -.01 -.11 .10 .06 1.00 
           
21 Effort Intensity -.14 -.52 -.41 -.27 -.11 -.11 -.38 -.23 .24 .17 -.01 .00 .11 .18 -.20 -.09 .07 .01 .06 -.04 1.00 
          
22 Financial Leverage -.04 -.29 -.14 .00 .02 -.23 -.15 -.04 .16 .21 .06 .05 .15 .13 -.02 .18 .05 .00 -.04 .14 .13 1.00 
         
23 Firm Age .18 -.12 .15 .15 .13 .13 -.08 -.15 .08 .12 -.09 .18 .09 .15 -.16 .18 .15 -.01 -.09 -.02 .10 .04 1.00 
        
24 Market Size .09 .33 .36 .04 -.05 -.09 .03 .19 -.18 -.03 .01 .06 -.05 .02 -.03 .02 .01 -.02 -.22 -.03 -.22 -.07 .14 1.00 
       
25 Market Share -.10 -.18 -.05 .05 -.05 .06 .00 -.10 .13 .05 -.12 .02 .06 .02 .13 .14 -.07 -.04 .07 -.01 .15 .08 .04 -.41 1.00 
      
26 Market Growth -.02 -.03 -.08 -.03 -.01 .06 -.03 -.02 -.02 -.04 -.02 .00 -.04 -.01 .02 -.08 -.04 .02 .06 -.01 .05 -.07 -.08 .04 -.05 1.00 
     
27 Profit .07 .03 .33 .25 -.04 -.20 .27 .07 -.02 .05 .04 .31 .07 .07 .26 .15 -.02 -.08 -.08 -.01 -.26 -.07 .16 .10 .30 -.02 1.00 
    
28 Revenue .05 -.04 .28 .31 -.04 -.07 -.05 .07 .05 .09 -.08 .19 .13 .09 .22 .18 -.17 -.15 -.02 -.02 .02 .07 .20 .14 .57 -.03 .56 1.00 
   
29 Industry Concentration -.20 -.35 -.47 -.25 -.02 .26 -.12 -.19 .23 .01 .01 .01 .08 .00 -.05 -.06 -.03 .10 .26 .11 .30 .10 -.09 -.26 .28 .16 -.03 .12 1.00 
  
30 Organizational Slack .06 .14 .13 .14 .11 .20 .62 .08 -.09 -.07 .07 .16 -.06 -.06 .17 -.06 -.07 -.04 .03 .01 -.30 -.29 .00 -.12 .09 -.01 .38 .07 -.10 1.00 
 
31 Marketing Department Power -.08 -.01 -.01 -.02 .00 -.01 .13 .02 -.08 -.17 -.02 -.13 -.15 -.01 .04 -.09 -.04 -.01 .42 -.01 -.09 -.03 -.13 .02 -.08 -.01 .01 -.06 .01 .08 1.00 
29 
 
The distribution of Tobin’s q appears in Figure 2. As expected, it has a long flat 
right tail. The mean and the median Tobin’s q are fairly close to each other, suggesting 
that for the most part, the distribution is somewhat balanced. 
FIGURE 2 











Table 5 presents the annual mean firm values (Tobin’s q) of the firms in the data, 
split by companies whose CEOs have high vs. low marketing experience. The time 
series plots of the same data appear in Figure 3. The mean Tobin’s q of firms, whose 
CEOs have high marketing experience are higher than those with low marketing 
experience in all but one year. I investigate the drivers of this difference by developing 






























MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND ESTIMATION 
My model comprises six different equations with R&D intensity, patents, 
trademarks, advertising intensity, SG&A intensity, and Tobin’s q as the dependent 
































variables. In each equation, subscript i represents the firm and subscript t represents the 
year. 
Innovation Equations 
1.       =    +            (   ) +             (   ) ×          (   ) +
           (   ) ×         (   ) + ∑         
   
    + ∑        +     +     
2.       =    +            (   ) +        (   ) +            (   ) ×
         (   ) +            (   ) ×         (   ) +  ∑         
   
    +
∑        +     + µ   
3.      =    +            (   ) +        (   ) +            (   ) ×
         (   ) +            (   ) ×         (   ) +  ∑         
   
    +
∑        +     +     
where RND is R&D intensity, PAT is the number of patents, and TM is the number of 
trademarks, LMKTGEXP is natural logarithm of the CEO’s marketing experience, 
LCEOOWN is natural logarithm of the market value of shares held by the CEO, 
INDCONC is industry concentration, IND is a vector of K-1 dummy variables 
representing K different industries, and C is a vector of control variables, including 
engineering experience.  , ξ, and   are parameter vectors,  ,  , and   capture year fixed 
effects, and  , µ, and   are the error terms. 
Marketing Intensity Equations   
4.      =    +            (   ) +            (   ) ×         (   ) +
           (   ) ×          (   ) + ∑         
   




5.       =    +            (   ) +            (   ) ×         (   ) +
           (   ) ×          (   ) + ∑         
   
    + ∑        +    +     
where AD is advertising intensity,   is a parameter vector,   captures the year fixed 
effect, u is the error term, SGA is SG&A intensity or the ratio of selling, general, and 
administrative expenses to total firm assets,   is a parameter vector,   captures the year 
fixed effect, e is the error term, and the other terms are as defined earlier. The control 
variables are the same as those in the R&D equation, except financial leverage because 
leverage, which involves long-term debt, may matter for a long-term high-level 
investment like R&D. The remaining variables are the same as those in the RND and 
advertising equations. In the advertising intensity, SG&A intensity, and firm value 
equations, I also include a variable to capture the CEO’s experience in functional areas 
other than marketing and engineering. I do not include this variable in the innovation 
equations as I expect engineering experience to dominate all other experience.      
Firm Value Equation 
6.       =     +            (   ) +       (   ) +       (   ) +      (   ) +
       (   ) +        (   ) + +           (   ) ×         (   ) +
           (   ) ×         (   ) + ∑        
   
    + ∑         +    +     
where LTQ is firm value measured by natural logarithm of Tobin’s q, LPAT is natural 
logarithm of firm patents, LTM is the natural logarithm of number of trademarks,   is a 
parameter vector,   captures the year fixed effects, and   is the error term. The control 
variables for this equation include all the control variables in the previous equations plus 
CEO compensation, firm profit, and firm revenues as these variables have been shown to 




organizational slack in this equation because these variables have accounting relationships 
with the dependent variable. In all the equations, consistent with prior research (Dotzel et al. 
2013; Morgan and Rego 2006; Sorescu and Spanjol 2008), I lag some of the independent 
variables by one year to account for their potential endogeneity.  
Endogeneity of CEO’s Marketing Experience 
The CEO’s marketing experience is endogenous because it could be argued that 
firms may select CEOs based on their prior marketing experience and these CEOs’ 
subsequent marketing experience could depend on this selection. To control for this 
potential endogeneity, I estimate the model using appropriate instruments and the two-
stage least squares (2SLS) method. Consistent with Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal 
(2015), I use the average marketing experience of other CEOs in the industry as an 
instrument. While the average marketing experience of other CEOs is likely to be 
correlated with the focal CEO’s marketing experience, it should not directly influence 
the value of the focal firm. Therefore, such an instrument has face validity. I also use the 
CEO’s marketing educational background as an additional instrument because it would 
directly affect the length of the CEO’s marketing experience but not the value of the firm 
that the CEO leads. An individual’s educational background will contribute to the length 
of his/her experience in related functional areas. However, it will not have a direct 
bearing on the performance of the firm that he/she leads. Thus, these instruments provide 
strong exclusion restrictions. 
I collect data on the CEO’s marketing education from Bloomberg Businessweek 
and LinkedIn. I operationalize it as 1 if the CEO has an undergraduate, master’s, or 





I first estimate a regression model of the CEO’s marketing experience as a 
function of the instruments and other exogenous variables in the system. I use the 
predicted values of the CEO’s marketing experience in the subsequent models’ 
estimation.   
The six equations form a recursive system. The observations in each of the 
equations are not all the same because some of the variables are lagged in some 
equations. Cross-correlation analysis also shows that the error terms in the trademarks 
and patents equations are correlated and the error terms in the other four equations are 
correlated with one another. Therefore, I estimated each of the two sets of equations 
using a seemingly unrelated regression estimation approach (Zellner 1962).  
Because patents and trademarks are count variables that are overdispersed, I use 
negative binomial regression for Equations (2) and (3). As there are many firm-year 
observations with no patents or no trademarks in a year, I use the zero-inflated negative 
binomial regression to account for excess zeros. For parsimony, I capture unobserved 
heterogeneity through industry fixed effects.  
 
RESULTS 
The results of the first-stage model appear in Table 6. Clearly, both the 
instruments are significant (p < .01), suggesting that the CEO’s marketing experience is 
indeed endogenous. Furthermore, these instruments capture a substantial portion of the 







First Stage Model Results of Endogeneity of CEO’s Marketing Experience 
Parameter/Independent Variable Marketing Experience 
Coefficient (SE) 
Intercept -3.009 (4.484) 
Average Marketing Experience of Industry 
CEOs 
-1.456 (.108)*** 
Marketing Education .761 (.137)*** 
CEO’s Age -.692 (.242)*** 
Firm Age .226 (.037)*** 
Market Size .714 (.322)** 
Market Growth -.333 (.458) 
Marketing Department Power -.005 (.002)*** 
CEO’s Gender -.668 (.124)*** 
R-squared .38 
Notes:  *p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. Sample size = 1,031.  
 
 
The results for the patents and trademarks equations appear in Table 7. The 
results for the R&D intensity, SG&A intensity, advertising intensity, and firm value 
equations are presented in Table 8. From these tables, the CEO’s marketing experience 
has a significant impact on R&D intensity (p < .01), supporting H1. However, while the 
coefficient of the CEO’s marketing experience in the trademarks equation is positive, it 
is insignificant (p > .10), and in the patents equation, it is negative and significant (p < 
.01). Marketing experience does not necessarily help create more patents or trademarks 
as firms led by CEOs with high engineering experience dominate the creation of patents. 
Industries in which firms are very active in patenting--such as the high-tech industry--
usually have CEOs with engineering background. In addition, since most patents are in 
forms of new inventions, and inventions require technical abilities, it can be argued that 
CEOs with engineering experience can be more effective in these areas. Indeed, the 




when it comes to trademarks, which are associated with final products (e.g., new 
products, existing products with new packaging, new formula, or new logo), marketing 
experience can be more helpful for a better understanding of consumer’s needs, which is 
critical to the success of trademarks. Interestingly, R&D intensity is an important 
positive driver of both the number of patents (p < .01) and trademarks (p < .10), the key 
innovation outcomes. Overall, because the CEO’s marketing experience is positively 
associated with R&D intensity, it has an indirect positive effect on patents and 
trademarks.  
From Table 8, the CEO’s marketing experience is positively associated with 
advertising intensity (p < .10) and SG&A intensity (p < .05), consistent with H2. The 
CEO’s marketing experience also has a direct positive effect on firm value (p < .01), 
supporting H3. The CEO’s ownership in the firm weakens the relationship between the 
CEO’s marketing experience and R&D intensity (p < .01), supporting H4a. However, the 
CEO’s ownership in the firm does not significantly moderate the relationship between 
the CEO’s marketing experience and advertising intensity or SG&A intensity (p > .10). 
This result may have something to do with the measures I am using. As discussed 
earlier, some of marketing activities such as brand building and customer loyalty, may 
require resources and costs which are realized immediately but will benefit the firm in 
the long-term. Advertising and sales spending of the firm might not be categorized in 
those categories. In addition, SG&A includes some non-marketing expenses as well. 
Therefore, increasing the CEO’s ownership in the firm does not necessarily affect firm 
expenditure towards these particular types of expenditures. Industry concentration 




intensity (p < .05) and SG&A (p < .01) and advertising intensities (p < .01), strongly 
supporting H5a and H5b, respectively. I can conclude that the positive effect of the CEO’s 
marketing experience on R&D intensity and on marketing intensity is stronger in 
industries with greater competition.  
 
TABLE 7 






 Focal Variables  
Intercept 5.053 (15.043) .270 (.057)*** 
CEO’s Marketing Experience  -2.228 (.468)*** .136 (.377) 
R&D Intensity  7.639 (2.464)*** 1.994 (1.092)* 
Interactions 
CEO’s Marketing Experience × CEO’s 
Ownership Share  
.185 (.040)*** -.008 (.032) 
CEO’s Marketing Experience × Industry 
Concentration  
1.905 (1.535) -.488 (.924) 
CEO and Management Level Controls 
CEO’s Age  1.265 (.693)* -1.326 (.558)** 
CEO’s Duality  .383 (.146)*** -.235 (.110)** 
CEO’s Tenure  -.330 (.098)*** .036 (.070) 
CEO’s Total Experience  .069 (.367) .891 (.249)*** 
CEO’s Engineering Experience  .240 (.056)*** -.005 (.048) 
CEO’s Experience within Firm  .137 (.078)* .086 (.066) 
CEO’s Ownership Share  -.130 (.051)** .062 (.035)* 
CEO’s Compensation Ratio  -.164 (.501) -.693 (.375)* 
CEO’s Gender  .226 (.275) .548 (.210)*** 
CMO’s Presence in TMT  -.232 (.164) -.259 (.113)** 
COO’s Presence in TMT -.142 (.114) -.217 (.089)** 
Marketing Department Power  .009 (.004)** .001 (.003) 
Firm and Industry Level Controls 
Firm Age  -.179 (.103)* -.133 (.068)* 
Number of Employees .573 (.075)*** .576 (.050)*** 
Market Size  -.657 (1.094) -.271 (.679) 
Market Growth  1.852 (1.083)* .406 (.685) 
Market Share 6.047 (1.385)*** -3.548 (.696)*** 
Industry Concentration  2.112 (7.204) .603 (4.032) 
Financial Leverage  .444 (.647) -.635 (.375)* 
Organizational Slack  1.676 (1.013)* 1.234 (.848) 
Effort Intensity  .385 (.507) -.818 (.467)* 
Model Fit Statistica 
Log-likelihood = -3,342.98 
χ2 =1131.07; p < .01. 
Log-likelihood = -3,165.11 
χ2 = 514.57; p < .01.  
Notes: ZINB = Zero Inflated Negative Binomial. *p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. Sample size = 879. 



















Intercept -.178 (.229) 1.703 (.997)* -.103 (.287) 1.204 (1.785) 
CEO’s Marketing 
Experience  
.042 (.009)*** .100 (.040)** .020 (.011)* 
.200 (.071)*** 
R&D Intensity     1.409 (.259)*** 
Advertising Intensity     .364 (.238) 
SG&A Intensity     .594 (.074)*** 
PATENT     .012 (.007)* 
TRADEMARK     .015 (.007)** 
Interactions 
CEO’s Marketing 
Experience × CEO’s 
Ownership Share  
-.004 
(.001)*** 
             -.004 (.004)              -.001 (.001) -.011 (.006)* 
CEO’s Marketing 




       -.260 (.082)***        -.081 (.024)*** -.106 (.148) 
CEO and Management Level Controls 
CEO’s Age  .015 (.014) -.099 (.052)* -.004 (.015) -.211 (.111)* 
CEO’s Duality  -.004 (.002)* .001 (.011) -.005 (.003) .002 (.019) 
CEO’s Tenure  -.002 (.002) .007 (.007) .0002 (.002) .022 (.013)* 
CEO’s Total Experience  -.019 (.006)***   -.007 (.058) 
CEO’s Experience 
within Firm  
.003 (.002)* -.027 (.007)*** -.003 (.002)* .0003 (.012) 
CEO’s Ownership Share  .005 (.001)*** .001 (.004) .0002 (.001) .027 (.007)*** 
CEO’s Engineering 
Experience  
.008 (.001)*** -.005 (.006) -.008 (.002)*** -.015 (.013) 
CEO’s Other Experience  -.004 (.015) -.010 (.004)**  
CEO’s Compensation 
Ratio  
.008 (.008) .010 (.035) -.020 (.010)** .187 (.075)** 
CEO’s Compensation     -.028 (.008)*** 
CEO’s Gender  .012 (.005)** -.038 (.023) .005 (.007) .039 (.042) 
CMO’s Presence in 
TMT  
.011 (.003)*** .024 (.011)** -.007 (.003)** -.027 (.021) 
Marketing Department 
Power  
-.0004(.0001)*** -.001 (.0003)*** .000 (.000) .003 (.001)*** 
COO’s Presence in TMT  .003 (.002) .012 (.009) .004 (.002)* .021 (.017) 
Firm and Industry Level Controls 
Firm Age  -.002 (.002) .015 (.007)** .003 (.002) -.009 (.012) 
Number of Employees  -.006 (.001)*** -.015 (.005)*** .001 (.001) -.018 (.015) 
Market Size  .015 (.017) -.069 (.073) .015 (.021) .027 (.129) 
Market Growth  -.013 (.017) .011 (.075) -.001 (.022) .108 (.134) 
Market Share  .055 (.018)*** -.111 (.080) -.075 (.023)*** .437 (.153)*** 
Industry Concentration  .079 (.093) .209 (.408) -.016 (.117) .119 (.727) 
Effort Intensity  -.067 (.008)*** -.237 (.036)*** -.037 (.010)***  
Organizational Slack  .011 (.017) .303 (.072)*** .038 (.021)*  
Financial Leverage  -.044 (.009)***    
Profit     .039 (.005)*** 
Revenue     -.052 (.018)*** 
R-Square .60 .55 .30 .49 





From Table 7, the CEO’s ownership in the firm positively moderates the negative 
relationship between the CEO’s marketing experience and the number of patents (p < 
.01). A possible reason is that the CEO’s ownership in the firm serves as a motivator to 
raise the number of patents by providing the mindset of cashing in on the future value of 
R&D output. The moderating effects of industry concentration on the number of patents 
and the number of trademarks are not significant (p > .10).  
Although I did not have formal hypotheses, I also test for any effects of the 
moderators on the relationship between the CEO’s marketing experience and firm value. 
From Table 8, the CEO’s ownership in the firm weakens the positive relationship 
between the CEO’s marketing experience and firm value (p < .10). 
Among the control variables, the CEO’s experience within the firm is positively 
associated with both patents (p < .10) and R&D intensity (p < .10) but negatively related 
to SG&A intensity (p < .01) and advertising intensity (p < .10). Marketing department 
power is positively associated with the number of patents (p < .05) and firm value (p < 
.01) but negatively related to R&D intensity (p < .01) and SG&A intensity (p < .01). The 
CEO’s engineering experience has a positive effect on patents (p < .01) and R&D 
intensity (p < .01) but a negative effect on advertising intensity (p < .01). 
Overall, the findings from the analysis largely support my hypotheses. The 
CEO’s marketing experience is positively associated with R&D intensity, marketing 
intensity, and firm value. The CEO’s ownership in the firm weakens the positive 
relationship between the CEO’s marketing experience and R&D intensity. Industry 




R&D intensity and between the CEO’s marketing experience and marketing intensity. A 
summary of the findings appears in Table 9.  
  
TABLE 9 







H1: Positive association 
between the CEO’s 
marketing experience and 
innovation 




Firms led by CEOs with greater marketing experience 
boost innovation spending. However, they do not 
necessarily create more patents or trademarks as firms 
led by CEOs with high engineering experience 
dominate in the creation of patents.  
H2: Positive association 
between the CEO’s 
marketing experience and 
marketing intensity 




Firms led by CEOs with greater marketing experience 
invest more in marketing due to their greater 
exposure to and training in marketing.  
H3: Positive association 
between the CEO’s 
marketing experience and 
firm value 
+ + (Tobin’s q) Firms led by CEOs with greater marketing experience 
directly create higher shareholder value as marketing 
experience signals alignment of customer value with 
shareholder value to investors. 
H4a: Negative moderating 
effect of the CEO’s 
ownership on the 
relationship between the 
CEO’s marketing 
experience and innovation 
- - (R&D intensity) 
NS (Trademarks) 
+ (Patents) 
The role of the CEO’s marketing experience in 
enhancing innovation activity is diminished in firms 
where the CEO’s ownership in the firm is high as 
high firm ownership acts an internal motivator for the 
CEO to make long-term risky investments, making 
the CEO’s marketing experience somewhat 
redundant. Curiously, CEO’s ownership serves as a 
motivator to raise the number of patents by providing 
the mindset of cashing in on future value of R&D 
output. 
H4b: Negative moderating 
effect of the CEO 
ownership on the 
relationship between the 
CEO’s marketing 
experience and marketing 
intensity 




The role of the CEO’s marketing experience in 
enhancing marketing investment is unaffected by the 
CEO’s ownership in the firm.  
H5a: Negative moderating 
effect of industry 
concentration on the 
relationship between the 
CEO’s marketing 
experience and innovation 
- - (R&D intensity) 
NS (Patents) 
NS (Trademarks) 
The role of the CEO’s marketing experience in 
bolstering innovation activity is enhanced in firms 
facing strong competition that acts an external 
motivator to deploy his/her marketing experience for 
greater R&D investment.  
H5b: Negative moderating 
effect of industry 
concentration on the 
relationship between the 
CEO’s marketing 
experience and marketing 
intensity 




The role of the CEO’s marketing experience in 
boosting marketing spending is enhanced in firms 
facing strong competition that acts an external 
motivator to deploy his/her marketing experience for 
greater marketing investment.  






I performed a number of additional analyses to ensure that my results are robust. 
First, I re-estimated the 2SLS models using the industry percentage of firms whose 
CEOs have a marketing background as the instrument in lieu of average marketing 
experience of other CEOs in the industry, but the results did not substantively change. 
Second, I re-estimated the models using firm fixed effects instead of industry fixed 
effects. Again, it produced the same substantive results for the focal variables. Third, I 
re-estimated the model using the generalized estimating equation (GEE) approach. The 
results did not materially change. Fourth, I replaced the CEO’s marketing experience by 
a dummy variable representing whether the CEO had a marketing background, 
consistent with some prior studies (e.g., Barker and Mueller 2002). The main results did 
not substantively change. I report the results in APPENDIX I Tables 20 and 21.  
Fifth, I re-estimated the patent and trademark models using a quasi-Poisson 
approach and obtained consistent results. Sixth, I re-estimated the models using stepwise 
regression by sequentially adding interactions to the main model. The results remained 
robust. Seventh, I estimated a model by adding sales experience as an additional control 
variable. The results (see APPENDIX I Tables 22 and 23) show that the effects of the 
focal variables remain the same.  
Eighth, I re-estimated the models by controlling for the CEO’s experience in 
additional functional areas (e.g., operations, finance, law) and found that the results on 
the main variables did not change. Ninth, I tested similar relationships using the CEO’s 
experience in other functional areas as the focal variables in lieu of the CEO’s marketing 




with marketing experience. Tenth, I performed an analysis of a subsample of the CEOs 
with at least some marketing experience to control for the recency of marketing 
experience and the origin of experience (inside the firm vs. outside the industry) and 
their potential moderating roles. I found that the CEO’s outside industry marketing 
experience positively moderates the relationships. In all these different cases, the main 
results were substantively consistent, indicating the significance of the impact of the 
CEO’s marketing experience on strategic firm-level outcomes.  
Mediation Tests 
I did not hypothesize mediation in my main model, but because the CEO’s 
marketing experience is positively associated with R&D and marketing intensities and 
because these variables have a positive impact on firm value, partial mediation is likely. 
To test for this possibility, I performed a Sobel test (Sobel 1982) of mediation. The 
results support partial mediation for R&D intensity (p < .01) and SG&A intensity (p < 
.05). I conclude that R&D intensity and SG&A intensity partially mediate the effect of 
the CEO’s marketing experience on firm value.  
 
IMPLICATIONS 
Findings of this research offer important implications for both theory and 
managerial practice. From a theoretical standpoint, this research contributes to the 
ongoing debate on the importance of marketing at the strategic level of the firm. My 
research addresses the movement toward corporate-level role of marketing by combining 
marketing’s strategic role with upper-echelon and top management research. What the 




shareholders could be explained, at least in part, by the profile of its upper echelon 
(Chaganti and Sambharya 1987). By studying and showing the impact of the CEO’s 
marketing experience on measurable firm outcomes, in particular, firm value, this study 
provides a new perspective about the strategic role of marketing, extending previous 
research on the presence of the CMO in TMT as a representative of marketing at the 
corporate strategy level (e.g., Germann, Ebbes, and Grewal 2015; Nath and Mahajan 
2008, 2011; Whitler, Krause, and Lehmann 2018). It also addresses some of the 
concerns raised by prior research (e.g., Boyd, Chandy, and Cunha 2010; Nath and 
Mahajan 2008; Moorman and Rust 1999) regarding the dwindling influence of 
marketing. My findings show that the presence of marketing at the corporate strategy 
level in form of the CEO’s marketing experience has a positive impact on firm value. 
This means that the role of marketing in top management can help firms make long-term 
investments in R&D and marketing and improve shareholder value.  
Prior findings on the direct effect of the CEO’s marketing background on 
innovation are divergent and exhibit limitations. For instance, Barker and Mueller (2002) 
show that firms headed by CEOs with marketing and R&D/engineering background 
spend more on R&D than firms led by CEOs with non-marketing/R&D backgrounds. 
However, their limited sample is selective and contains only one year of data. In 
contrast, Rodenbach and Brettel (2012) find that the impact of the CEO’s 
marketing/R&D background on R&D expenditures is insignificant. But their research 
does not control for many variables and is narrow in its operationalization of the CEO’s 
experience in marketing or R&D/engineering. By analyzing a comprehensive dataset 




potentially influential variables, my research extends prior research, addresses the key 
limitations of previous studies, and pens new research avenues. 
In addition to the main positive effect of the CEO’s marketing experience on firm 
value, my findings suggest that firms led by CEOs with greater marketing experience 
spend more on R&D and marketing activities. By introducing the CEO’s marketing 
experience as a key driver of innovation and marketing investments, this research 
extends the finding of Yadav, Prabhu, and Chandy (2009) that the CEO’s attention can 
have an impact on firm innovativeness. I find that CEOs with higher marketing 
experience spend more on innovation and marketing and create more innovation outputs 
than CEOs with lower marketing experience.   
This study also reveals new boundary conditions on the effect of the CEO’s 
marketing experience on firm outcomes. By introducing the CEO’s ownership in the 
firm as a moderator of the impact of the CEO marketing experience on firm outcomes, I 
extend the literature on the relationship between top management compensation 
structure and firm performance (e.g., Core, Holthausen, and Larcker 1999; Currim, Lim, 
and Kim 2012). The results show that while increasing the CEO’s ownership in the firm 
may seem like the right decision to incentivize him/her to spend on riskier and long-term 
R&D and marketing activities, it may not be adequate to enhance desirable outcomes if 
the CEO already has more intensive marketing experience.  
The findings also show that the effect of the CEO’s marketing experience on firm 
outcomes is stronger in more competitive industries. By introducing the CEO’s 
marketing experience as a factor that can help firms survive in intense competition, this 




2013; Gatignon 1984). The finding that CEOs with marketing experience spend more on 
marketing and innovation in general and that this effect is accentuated in more 
competitive industries, shines a spotlight on the role of external motivation in enhancing 
the impact of the CEO’s marketing experience on firm activities and outcomes.   
From a managerial perspective, this study helps firms with their CEO selection 
and succession plans. The selection of a CEO is a critical organizational decision 
because organizations are seen as a reflection of their top managers and the decisions 
they make (Rajagopalan and Datta 1996). My research shows that in general firms led by 
CEOs with greater marketing experience create greater shareholder value than other 
firms. This finding suggests that all things equal, a firm is better off selecting a CEO 
with a strong marketing experience than one with a weak marketing experience. 
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Dotzel, Shankar, and Berry 2013), I calculated the 
net effects of the CEO’s marketing experience at the means for different industries. The 
results appear in Table 10. The CEO’s marketing experience has a greater effect on firm 
value in some industries than others.  
 
TABLE 10 
Summary of the CEO’s Marketing Experience and Its Effects on Firm Value (Tobin’s q) 
by Industry 
 
Industry Average CEO Marketing Experience Effect on Firm 
Value 
Car manufacturing 0 0 
Chemicals 1.08 .17 
High-tech 1.02 .13 
Consumer goods 1.41 .20 
Hospitality .438 .05 
Industrial/Construction/Machinery 1.45 .21 




In addition, enhancing the CEO’s marketing experience/mindset can also help the 
firm. Firms can train and expose their CEOs to more marketing issues so that he/she can 
develop a better grasp of marketing issues and better utilize the firm’s marketing assets.  
According to the findings, CEOs with marketing experience invest more in 
innovation and marketing. This finding is useful for firms in choosing their CEOs based 
on their strategic goals. Some firms may look to cut their costs, while others may want to 
increase their market share. Based on this study, if a firm wishes to encourage 
innovation or invest more in marketing activities such as advertising, it is better off 
appointing a CEO with a high level of marketing experience. By the same token, if a 
firm is in a temporary survival mode, seeking to reduce R&D and marketing 
expenditures, it may wish to choose a CEO with limited marketing experience. 
Increasing the stock-based compensation of CEOs to enhance performance and 
risk appetite is a commonly adopted strategy of many big firms. In general, such a 
strategy may help when the CEO is risk-averse, encouraging him/her to make riskier 
decisions. My findings show that the CEO’s ownership in the firm has a negative effect 
on the impact of the CEO’s marketing experience on firm outcomes. Marketing CEOs 
are not risk-averse in general and increasing their ownership in the firm is not likely to 
impact their propensity to make riskier decisions. Therefore, to grow firm value, firms 
may want to look beyond stock ownership to incentivize CEOs with extensive marketing 
experience.  
Firms competing in more competitive industries are better off having a CEO with 
high marketing experience. My results show that CEOs with greater marketing 




extensive marketing experience typically have a solid understanding of the market, know 
how to use market information to outwit competition, and may not be as risk-averse as 
other CEOs. This will likely lead to superior firm value.  
Finally, my findings can help firms predict their competitors’ moves based on the 
marketing experience of their competitor firms’ CEOs. For instance, a firm can expect a 
rival firm headed by a CEO with high marketing experience to invest more in innovation 
and advertising. This expectation can better inform the firm’s own marketing and 
innovation investment decisions. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
This research has certain limitations that offer opportunities for further research. 
First, my sample contains only U.S. firms. The impact of the CEO on firm outcomes 
may differ across countries (Crossland and Hambrick 2007), so it would be interesting to 
extend the research to firms listed outside the U.S. Second, I did not explore how the 
different marketing positions a CEO may have held in her/his career might modify the 
effects of the CEO’s marketing experience on firm outcomes. Future research can 
examine this issue. Third, I use patents and trademarks as innovation outputs that could 
be augmented using new products if relevant data are available. Fourth, while I focus on 
the CEO’s marketing experience as a key driver of firm performance, I do not measure 
the marketing mindset of the CEO. Although marketing mindset may be highly 
correlated with marketing experience, some CEOs without much marketing experience 
may exhibit a high level of marketing mindset. Future research with richer data on 




of the firms or industries in which CEOs may have worked. Working in different 
industries or firms may have different effects on the CEO’s mindset and may ultimately 
affect his/her decision-making. Future research can investigate the effects of experience 
in different industries on strategic outcomes.  
This study is among the first to study the impact of the CEO’s marketing 
experience on important firm-level outcomes, such as firm value. My results show that 
the CEO’s marketing experience is a significant positive direct driver of marketing 
intensity, innovation, and firm value. The CEO’s marketing experience’s impact is 
weakened when the CEO’s stockholding is higher and strengthened when the industry is 
more competitive. The results suggest that firms need to seriously consider the CEO’s 
marketing experience as a profound factor in CEO selection and promotion if they want 















CHAPTER III  
CEO’S MARKETING EXPERIENCE, ACTIVIST INVESTOR INTERVENTION, 
MARKETING SPENDING, AND FIRM VALUE 
 
In recent years, activist investors and the firms they target have attracted 
considerable attention from media, academia, and the legal community. During the past 
15 years, the number of activist investor campaigns has multiplied more than five-fold. 
While finance, accounting, and management scholars have examined the impact of 
activist investors on several financial and managerial outcomes such as stock price, 
corporate governance, and analysts’ recommendations, the effects of activist investor 
intervention on marketing (advertising, and sales, general, and administrative [SG&A]) 
spending and marketing-related spending (e.g., R&D spending) have been unexplored. 
Furthermore, the roles of the CEO’s marketing experience in these relationships are 
unknown.  
In this research, using a sample of 455 firms targeted by activist investors over 
six years (2010-2015), I examine the impact of activist investor intervention on 
marketing intensity, R&D intensity, and firm value through a differences-in-differences 
(DIFF-IN-DIFF) approach. I further explore the moderating role of the CEO’s marketing 
experience in the effects of activist investor intervention on these outcomes. After 
controlling for selection through a Heckman model and using propensity score matching 
(PSM), I show activist investor intervention lowers advertising intensity and R&D 
intensity and also has a negative indirect effect on firm value. Importantly, the CEO’s 




intervention has a detrimental effect on not just marketing spending but also on 
innovation and firm value, but importantly CEOs with marketing experience can 
mitigate the deleterious effects. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Activist investors and the firms they target have attracted considerable attention 
from the media, academia, and the legal community. For the past 30 years, institutional 
investors, individuals, labor unions, and other groups have engaged in shareholder 
activism (Brav et al. 2018). In recent years, the number of activist campaigns has 
increased substantially. Activist investment firms (typically hedge funds) such as Icahn 
Enterprises (led by Carl Icahn), Third Point Partners (led by Daniel Loebb), Pershing 
Square Capital (led by Bill Ackman), and Trian Fund Management (led by Nelson Peltz) 
tend to intervene in a target firm’s governance and management through shareholder 
campaigns that includes a significant hike in their shareholding of the target firm.  
Through their heightened levels of shareholding, activist investors seek to 
redirect the firm by making strategic changes such as the induction of new board 
members, change of the chief executive officer (CEO), cost-cutting, downsizing, and 
pursuit of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). Activist investor intervention can directly 
signal impending changes to investors and their valuation of the target firm. If the 
intervention is successful, it can further significantly alter the target firm’s strategic 
decisions and outcomes, including firm value. However, even if activist investors do not 
succeed in their campaigns, the target firms will undergo some changes to fend off and 




While finance, accounting, and management scholars have extensively examined 
the impact of activist investor intervention on different aspects such as corporate 
governance, stock returns, analysts’ recommendations (e.g., Brav et al. 2008; Swanson 
and Young 2017), the impact of activist investor intervention on marketing spending has 
been unexplored. Furthermore, the effects of activist investor intervention on innovation 
outcomes has been underexplored. These issues are particularly important for marketers 
because activist investor intervention can significantly alter the allocation of resources to 
marketing activities, which can weaken or strengthen marketing’s role in the firm’s 
financial performance (Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009).  
The strength or weakness of marketing’s role in the firm’s innovation and 
financial outcomes may depend on the CEO’s marketing background and experience 
(Mirahmad and Shankar 2018; Warren et al. 2018). Thus, the CEO’s marketing 
experience may also play a significant role in the effects of activist investor intervention 
on firm outcomes.     
In this research, I study the impact of activist investor intervention on marketing 
and R&D intensities and firm value. In particular, I address the following critical 
questions: (1) What are the main effects of activist investor intervention on marketing 
intensity, innovation intensity, and firm value? (2) What is the role of the CEO’s 
marketing experience in these effects? To answer these questions, I assemble and 
analyze a unique panel dataset comprising 455 firms that activist investors targeted 





The results show that activist investor intervention has a negative direct effect on 
firm advertising intensity and R&D intensity, and a negative indirect effect on firm 
value. Furthermore, the finding shows that the CEO’s marketing experience mitigates 
the deleterious effects.   
My research makes three important contributions. First, by investigating the 
impact of activist investor intervention on strategic firm-level outcomes, and in 
particular, marketing- related outcomes, I shed light on how activist investor intervention 
influences marketing spending and strategy that are critical to financial performance 
(e.g., Joshi and Hanssens 2009; Srinivasan and Hanssens 2009).  
Second, by proposing and testing the boundary conditions under which the 
effects of activist investor intervention on firm level outcomes may be weakened or 
strengthened, my research contributes to the extensive literature on shareholder activism 
in finance, accounting, and management (e.g., Brav et al. 2018; David et al. 2001). My 
research also extends studies that suggest that the impact of activist investors on firm 
performance is context based (e.g., Bushee 1998). 
Third, by showing the moderating role of the CEO’s marketing experience in 
mitigating the potential detrimental effects of activist investor intervention on marketing 
activities and consequently on firm value, it offers fresh insights on the role of marketing 
at the corporate strategy level, extending Boyd, Chandy, and Cunha (2010) and Nath and 
Mahajan (2008). My findings show that the CEO’s marketing experience can mitigate 






THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
Prior research has viewed shareholder activism as a response to the agency 
conflict in publicly traded companies with absentee owners (Gillan and Starks 2007; 
Swanson and Young 2017). In recent years, the number of shareholder activism 
campaigns has increased hyperbolically (Coffee and Palia 2015). According to the 
activist investors report published by Harvard Law School, activist investors attacked 
more than 2,200 companies worldwide during 2013-2016 period. In these companies, 
activist investors demand changes in areas such as operations, capital structure, and 
corporate governance (Swanson and Young 2017). While some of these changes might 
lead to better returns for shareholders, activist investors have their share of criticisms. 
Critics contend that activist investors pressure managers to make decisions that sacrifice 
long-term financial goals for short-term gains (e.g., Bebchuk, Brav, and Jiang 2015). As 
Coffee and Palia (2015) put, the predominant criticism of shareholder activism is based 
on the belief that it amounts in substance to a “pump and dump” scheme under which 
activist investors create a short-term spike in the target stock’s price, then exit, leaving 
the other shareholders to experience diminished profitability over the long-run. 
However, proponents of activist investors argue that firms have a tendency to overspend 
in several areas and activist investors can improve the efficiency of the firm by 
reallocating the resources of the firm (Brav et al. 2018).  
The increased importance of investor activism and the widespread concern about 
activist investor intervention has created a growing stream of academic research in 
diverse fields such as law, finance, accounting, and management that examine the 




area focuses on the impact of activist investors on firm value (e.g., Allaire and Dauphin 
2016; Greenwood and Schor 2009). However, the effect of activist investors on 
marketing spending is underexplored.  
There has been a flourishing stream of research in marketing about the role of marketing 
spending in firm performance (e.g., Joshi and Hanssens 2010; McAlister, Srinivasan, 
and Kim 2007). Some studies suggest that spending on marketing activities can enhance 
financial performance. Given that activist investor intervention is becoming a growing 
phenomenon, a better understanding of the effects of activist intervention on marketing 
and innovation expenditures is critically important to marketing researchers and 
practitioners.  
In addition, marketing scholars have voiced their concern over the fading of 
marketing influence at the corporate strategy level (e.g., Anderson 1982; Kumar and 
Shah 2009; Moorman and Rust 1999). As Boyd, Chandy, and Cunha (2010) argue, with 
fading strategic role of marketing, it will be harder for managers to ask for resources to 
carry out marketing activities. If activist investors are as myopic as critics suggest, 
marketing spending might be in even greater danger (Mizik 2010). Activist investor 
intervention may further deteriorate the conditions for marketers if such investors end up 
cutting marketing costs in the target firms. Importantly, cuts in marketing and innovation 
spending may harm financial performance in the long-run. 
Main/Direct Effects 
Activist Investors and Marketing Intensity 
Managers can pursue different strategies, each yielding different cash flow 




have expressed concern over such myopic behavior by U.S. corporate managers (Bushee 
1998). These critics describe activist investors as “hit-and-run” investors who care only 
about short-term earnings (e.g., Coffee and Palia 2015). In addition, the management 
literature categorizes hedge funds as short-term institutional owners who prefer short-
term earnings to long-term gains (Neubaum and Zahra 2006). Hedge-fund activism is 
typically associated with three key changes at the target firm: increased financial 
leverage, greater shareholder payout, and reduced long-term investment (Coffee and 
Palia 2015). Because hedge funds constitute the majority of activist investors, most 
activist investors likely have a myopic approach.  
In contrast, proponents of shareholder activism argue that investment-limiting 
interventions by activist investors can be good for firms as they move the target firms 
toward optimal investment levels because managers tend to overinvest (Bebchuk et al. 
2015). They argue that while firms may become leaner in terms of expenses, they do not 
become weaker; furthermore, an efficient reallocation of financial resources will benefit 
the firm in the long-term (Brav et al. 2018). However, critics of this perspective declare 
that the assumption that managements typically engage in inefficient empire building is 
out of date and ignores the impact of major changes in executive compensation. The 
assertion that managements are systematically biased toward inefficient expansion and 
investment becomes critical as the scale and magnitude of “investment-limiting 
interventions” by activists call into question the ability of the American public 
corporations to engage in long-term investments (Coffee and Palia 2015).  
Firms typically treat marketing as discretionary (Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal 




set of expenses to be cut in an economic downturn or when managers fear they may not 
be able to meet their earning targets. Marketing activities create intangible assets with 
long-term effects on business performance (e.g., brand equity, customer loyalty) that 
often also require substantial immediate costs to support them (Mizik 2010). Therefore, 
managers or investors with a myopic view do not typically consider marketing spending 
critical. Such investors will likely cut marketing expenditures after intervention, leading 
to my first hypothesis.  
H1: Activist investor intervention is negatively associated with marketing 
intensity. 
 
Activist Investors and R&D Intensity 
There is an ongoing debate among academics, practitioners, and policymakers 
about the consequences of stock market pressure on managerial incentives to engage in 
innovative activities with long-term value consequences that are not easily assessed by 
the market (e.g., Brav et al. 2018). The idea that stock market pressure leads to 
“managerial myopia” has been a recurring concern (Stein 1988; 1989) and has evolved 
into a heated debate in recent years as activist investors have increasingly come to 
dominate discussions of shareholder empowerment. The concern reached the peak in 
2015 when Laurence Fink, the chairman and CEO of BlackRock, the world’s largest 
institutional investor, argued that activist investors pressure corporate leaders to generate 
short-term gains at the expense of long-term value creation. However, proponents of 
activist investors remind critics of the firms that have benefited from activist investor 




Value implemented at Darden Restaurants with promotions and online ordering, has 
substantially benefitted the company (Markman 2018).  
Investment in R&D projects involve temporal trade-offs because these 
expenditures accrue in the near term with payoffs likely over the long term (David et al. 
2001). In other words, the costs of R&D projects are realized immediately, while the 
future benefits can be uncertain. Therefore, if managers or investors have a myopic 
view, they may not favor R&D spending.  
Prior research suggests that the owners who hold small stakes in numerous firms 
and trade in and out frequently create pressures for myopic investment behavior (Porter 
1992). Activist investors, in particular, hedge funds which constitute the majority of 
activist investors, target many firms and trade in and out frequently. Activist investors 
might have a negative impact on innovation spending because as Holmstrom (1989) 
argues, innovative activities involve the exploration of untested and unknown 
approaches that have a high probability of failure with contingencies that are impossible 
to foresee (Brav et al. 2018). Even if one considers the changes implemented by activist 
investors as a reallocation of resources to make the firm more efficient, it is likely that 
these investors make the R&D spending more efficient by cutting it. Therefore, activist 
investors are unlikely fans of R&D projects and may cut R&D spending after 
intervention. However, the findings from prior research are inconclusive with data 
limitations. While David et al. (2001) find that shareholder activism is positively 
associated with R&D spending in both the short- and long-term, Brav et al. (2018) find 
the exact opposite. In addition, the time period of events studied by these scholars stops 




2007, so prior studies do not capture the effects of these specific types of activist 
investors believed to be more radical in cutting firm’s long-term investments. Based on 
these arguments about R&D myopia of activist investors, I hypothesize that: 
H2: Activist investor intervention is negatively associated with R&D intensity.  
Activist Investors and Firm Value 
Critics of shareholder activism contend that activists pressure managers to make 
decisions that may result in positive short-term stock performance at the expense of 
long-term enterprise value (Swanson and Young 2017). As argued earlier, activist 
investors potentially limit R&D and marketing expenditures that may have a positive 
impact on firm value in the short-term but a negative effect in the long-term. However, 
proponents of activist investors argue that activist investor intervention is positively 
associated with firm stock price (Becht et al. 2017). Moreover, the interventions are not 
on average followed by a decline in the stock price over the five-year window after the 
arrival of activists (Brav et al. 2008).  
However, the results of prior research in finance and accounting of the effects of 
shareholder activism on firm value in the long-term are mixed. Brav et al. (2008) and 
Boyson and Mooradian (2011) find that shareholder activism is positively associated 
with firm value measured as ROA. By contrast, Allaire and Dauphin (2016) and 
Gantchev et al. (2017) do not find any positive effect of shareholder activism on firm 
value measured as Tobin’s q.  
Finance and accounting scholars conclude that studying the direct long-term 
effects of shareholder activism on firm value is indeed a difficult task, and that findings 




and Young 2017). In addition to the choice of the measure, the distribution of returns 
from shareholder activism may exhibit high variations among different firms. Some 
firms experience losses, while others gain value post intervention (Coffee and Palia 
2015). It is also possible activist investor interventions do not cause long-term gains or 
losses in the value of target firms (Cremers et al. 2015). Nevertheless, I expect that the 
perceptions about activist investors will likely signal negative value over a longer period 
such as a year, so I hypothesize that activist investor intervention has a negative direct 
effect on firm value. In addition, because R&D and marketing spending are drivers of 
firm value in the long-run, cutting these expenditures can hurt the firm value in the long-
run.  
H3: Activist investor intervention is negatively associated with firm value.  
Moderating Effects of CEO’s Marketing Experience  
In most cases, activist investors do not have complete control over the target 
firms. They typically hold limited stakes (less than 11%) in each firm (Becht et al. 
2017), so they must rely on persuasion of other shareholders and the firm’s internal 
governance mechanisms to implement changes (Cohn and Rajan 2013). However, as 
Brav et al. (2008) show, activist hedge funds are often successful in influencing 
managers and boards. The unconditional probability of an activist being successful in 
achieving at least one engagement outcome is 53% (Becht et al. 2017). Nevertheless, 
sometimes activists face opposition from managers, in particular, the CEO, when they 
try to implement their desired changes. The CEO and corporate governance have a 
critical role to play when a firm is attacked by activist investors. As Becht et al. (2017) 




the activist investor’s stake, support from governing body and other shareholders, and 
the institutional and legal framework. Block holders, such as families or founders and 
employee shareholders, generally support the incumbent directors. Therefore, the CEO 
of a target firm can have a significant impact on the success of an activist investor’s 
campaign.  
Firms utilize their marketing expertise when formulating strategies for 
advertising, sales, and other marketing-related activities (Pasa and Shugan 1996). CEOs 
with marketing experience pay greater attention to marketing spending and firms led by 
such CEOs exhibit higher marketing intensity (Mirahmad and Shankar 2018). CEOs 
with marketing experience have a better understanding and appreciation of the value that 
marketing spending can bring to the firm in the long run. CEOs with marketing 
experience are also more long-term oriented and tend to value R&D spending more than 
other CEOs (Barker and Mueller 2002; Mirahmad and Shankar 2018). Marketers view 
innovation as a solution to customers’ problems and as a significant driver of 
competitive advantage (Barker and Mueller 2002). Therefore, CEOs with marketing 
experience will likely fight activist investors when they are asked to cut spending on 
marketing and innovation because they view marketing and R&D expenditures as 
strategic assets capable of enhancing firm value in the long-run. This reasoning leads to 
the following hypotheses. 
H4: The CEO’s marketing experience mitigates the negative effect of activist 
investor intervention on marketing intensity. 
H5: The CEO’s marketing experience mitigates the negative effect of activist 





The conceptual model linking the constructs together with the relevant 
hypotheses appears in Figure 4. Activist investor intervention has a direct effect on each 
of marketing intensity, R&D intensity and firm value. The CEO’s marketing experience 
has a moderating effect on the effects of activist investor intervention on each of 




DATA AND VARIABLE OPERATIONALIZATION 
To test the hypotheses, I assembled a rich panel dataset consisting of firm-level 
financial data, CEO-level data, and activist investor campaign data from different 
FIGURE 4 
Conceptual Model Linking Activist Investor Intervention to Marketing Intensity, 




sources such as Thomson One, Thomson Reuters, COMPUSTAT, Boardex, Bloomberg 
Businessweek, and LinkedIn.  
An advantage of this approach is that I avoid common method bias by using 
separate data sources for my variables (Mithas, Krishnan, and Fornell 2005). I examine 
firms targeted only once by activist investors in the 2010-2015 period and which report 
at least one of R&D, advertising, SG&A expenditures for two years before and after the 
intervention. In this research, I focus on cases where managers resisted activist requests 
in the first place and activist went public with their demands. My sample consists of 455 
firms targeted by activist investors. I create a control group of matched firms. Table 11 
provides a list of the variables, their operationalization, and data sources.  
I collected data on activist shareholder interventions from the Thomson One 
database that covers all shareholder activism campaigns in the 2000-2019 period. It 
provides data on the start date of each campaign, the campaign status (win/loss/settled), 














Variable Operationalization and Data Sources for Essay 2 
Variable  Operationalization Data source 
Activist investor intervention A dummy which equals to 1 if the 
firm has been targeted by activist 
Thomson One 
Advertising intensity Ratio of advertising spending to total 
assets 
COMPUSTAT 
SG&A intensity Ratio of SG&A spending to total 
assets 
COMPUSTAT 
R&D intensity Ratio of R&D spending to total assets COMPUSTAT 
Firm value Tobin’s Q calculated as : 
((Asset - Common Value of Equity) + 
(Common Shares Outstanding * Fiscal 
year closing stock price))/Asset 
COMPUSTAT 
CEO’s marketing experience Ln of years of CEO’s experience in 
marketing positions + (Years of 
experience as CEO × Ratio of 
marketing experience to total 








A dummy which equals to 1 if 
marketing is the functional area with 
maximum experience and 0 otherwise 
Boardex, LikedIn, 
Bloomberg, NNDB, 
10-K and 20-F 
filings. 
CEO’s tenure Ln of years a person has served as the 
CEO of a firm 
Boardex, LikedIn, 
Bloomberg, NNDB, 
10-K and 20-F 
filings. 
Revenue Ln of firm total sales COMPUSTAT 
Profit Ln of firm net income COMPUSTAT 
Number of employees Ln of number of employees COMPUSTAT 
Institutional ownership Percentage of shares owned by 
Institutional Investors 
Thomson Reuters 
ROA Earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation, and amortization scaled 
by lagged total assets. 
COMPUSTAT 
Market value Number of common shares 
outstanding times the share price 
COMPUSTAT 
Market to book ratio The market value of the firm (sum of 
the market value of common equity, 
the debt in current liabilities, long-
term debt, preferred stock liquidating 
value, and deferred taxes and 
investment tax) divided by the book 







Marketing Intensity and R&D Intensity 
For marketing intensity, I use two different variables: advertising intensity and 
selling, general and administrative (SG&A) intensity. Consistent with the literature (e.g., 
Morck et al. 1988), I operationalize advertising intensity as the ratio of advertising 
expenditures to firm total asset at the beginning of the financial year, and SG&A 
intensity as the ratio of firm SG&A expenditures to firm total asset at the beginning of 
the financial year. I use these two measures to capture how marketing-intensive firms 
are. Advertising spending is a key measure of marketing investment (e.g., Erickson and 
Jacobson 1992; Joshi and Hanssen 2004). SG&A is also a key measure of marketing 
stock (e.g., Fang, Lee, and Yang 2015). I operationalize R&D intensity as the ratio of 
R&D spending to total assets at the beginning of the financial year (e.g., Brav et al. 
2018; Carpenter and Peterson 2002).  
CEO’s Marketing Experience 
I collected data on the CEO’s marketing experience from different data sources 
such as Boardex, Bloomberg Businessweek, SEC 10-K and 20-F filings, and LinkedIn. 
Consistent with prior research (Mirahmad and Shankar 2018), I operationalize the 
CEO’s marketing experience as the number of years of experience that a CEO spent in 
marketing-related positions. The CEO’s marketing experience works as a knowledge 
base, helping her/him build on the experience while working as a CEO, adding to the 
marketing experience she/he had prior to  appointment as the CEO. Therefore, to obtain 
the CEO’s marketing experience for the focal year, I add to the prior year’s marketing 
experience, the ratio of years in marketing positions to the total years of career 





Consistent with prior research (e.g., Dotzel and Shankar 2019; Dotzel, Shankar, 
and Berry 2013; Germann, Ebbs, and Grewal 2015; Grewal, Chandrashekaran, and 
Citrin, and 2010), I use Tobin’s q as a measure of firm value. It is a forward-looking 
measure that is based on stock price and captures long-term performance by comparing 
replacement and market values (Dotzel, Shankar, and Berry 2013). In addition, because 
accounting measures do not affect it, I can use it across different industries. I calculate 
Tobin’s q using stock price and common share outstanding at the end of the fiscal year. 
Table 12 and Table 13 show the descriptive statistics and correlation matrix, 
respectively. The values of the variables are in a reasonable range, consistent with prior 
research. The correlations among the focal variables, in particular, activist investor 
intervention and the CEO’s marketing experience (.03) are under .30, so 
multicollinearity is not an issue.  
 
TABLE 12 
Descriptive Statistics for Essay 2 
Variable Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Advertising Intensity 2,218 0.348 0.343 0.234 0 1.316 
SG&A Intensity 3,380 0.763 0.765 0.746 0 39.783 
R&D Intensity 2,826 0.424 0.486 0.288 0 2.411 
Tobin's q 1,060 1.971 1.555 1.456 0.38939 20.589 
CEO's Marketing Experience 6,304 0.736 0 0.986 0 3.367 
CEO's Marketing Background 6,304 0.156 0 0.363 0 1.000 
CEO's Tenure 6,304 1.781 0.343 0.932 0 4.111 
Revenue 6,304 6.184 6.337 2.576 0 13.089 
Profit 6,304 2.767 2.330 2.762 0 10.885 




Correlation Matrix for Essay 2 
   Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1 Activist Intervention 1.000                       
2 Post -0.009 1.000                     
3 Advertising Intensity 0.011 -0.004 1.000                   
4 SG&A Intensity -0.014 -0.012 0.174 1.000                 
5 R&D Intensity 0.058 0.007 -0.036 0.210 1.000               
6 Tobin's q -0.013 0.030 -0.029 0.253 0.165 1.000             
7 CEO's Marketing Experience 0.032 0.024 0.226 0.167 0.081 0.094 1.000           
8 CEO's Marketing Background 0.047 0.020 0.182 0.116 -0.039 0.105 0.760 1.000         
9 CEO's Tenure -0.043 -0.012 -0.043 -0.043 -0.005 -0.004 -0.168 -0.134 1.000       
10 Revenue 0.004 0.020 0.688 -0.042 0.166 -0.125 0.085 0.068 -0.045 1.000     
11 Profit -0.116 -0.010 0.495 -0.043 0.222 0.050 0.189 0.163 0.050 0.772 1.000   
12 Employee -0.047 0.019 0.656 -0.012 -0.020 -0.066 0.072 0.058 -0.046 0.855 0.721 1.000 
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MODEL DEVELOPMENT AND ESTIMATION 
Selection Model 
Before comparing the treated and control firms, I need to control for the selection 
of the treated firms. Activist investors target firms based on certain observable variables. 
I use a Heckman model to model selection (Heckman 1979). Some of the observable 
variables also influence the outcome variables of interest, namely, marketing spending, 
R&D spending, and firm value. To identify the model, I use the extent of institutional 
ownership of the firm as the instrument that satisfies the exclusion restriction. Activist 
investors are more likely to target firms with high institutional ownership (Carrothers 
2017; Swanson and Young 2017). Activist investors believe they can establish a 
“mutually beneficial relationship” with institutional owners and obtain their support in 
implementing their agenda (Carrothers 2017). I also include other instruments such as 
past profit, past profit margin, change in profit, and change in profit margin in the 
selection model. 
I estimate the following probit selection model. I calculate the Inverse Mills 
Ratio (IMR) and include it as a covariate in my subsequent DIFF-IN-DIFF models.  
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where ACTIVIST is a dummy that equals 1 if firm i is targeted by activist investors at 
time t and 0 otherwise, INSTOWN is the percentage of institutional ownership of the 
firm, PROF is net income, PROFMARG is the profit margin measured as the ratio of net 
income to total revenue, PROFCHANGE, is the percentage change in net income over 
the previous period, and PROFMARGCHANGE is the percentage change in profit 
margin over the previous period. IND is a vector of (k-1) dummy variables representing 
different industries (SIC 2 digit).   captures year fixed effects and   is the error term. 




Probit Selection Model Results 
Variable Coefficient 
Institutional Ownership .308 (.044)*** 
Profit Margin .00007 (.00008) 
Income .0002 (.0070) 
Profit Margin Change -.0002 (.0002) 
Income Change .0004 (.0003) 
Intercept -2.575 (.352)*** 




Propensity Score Matching 
To create a control group comparable to the treatment group, consistent with the 
literature in finance and accounting (e.g., Brav et al. 2018; Swanson and Young 2017), I 
use a propensity score matching approach. I divide the target firms into four samples: 
firms that report R&D spending, firms that report advertising spending, firms that report 




two years before and after intervention. I did the matching such that the treated and 
control firms are from the same time year. I estimated the following logistic regression 
models using variables from the year before activist intervention to predict activist 
intervention in the current year. I used the nearest neighbor algorithm for matching.  
8.            =    +         (   ) +           (   ) +       (   ) +
            (   ) + ∑         
   
    +    + ղ   
where ACTIVIST is a dummy that equals 1 if firm i is targeted by activist investors at 
time t and 0 otherwise, LSIZE represents firm market value. MBRATIO represents the 
market to book ratio of the firm. I operationalize it as the sum of the market value of 
common equity, the debt in current liabilities, long-term debt, preferred stock liquidating 
value, and deferred taxes and investment taxes, scaled by the book value of the firm. 
ROA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization, scaled by 
beginning-of-year assets. ROAGROWTH is firm ROA growth from year (t-3) to year (t-
1). IND is a vector of (k-1) dummy variables representing different industries (SIC 2 
digit).   captures year fixed effects and ղ is the error term. my final samples in total 
include 1,205 firms (treatment and control) and 1,733 CEOs.  
Tables 15 and Table 16 show the results of logistic regression estimated in different 















ROA .011 (.043) .006 (.032) -.004 (.021) -.104 (.092) 
ROA Growth .003 (.008) .001 (.008) .001 (.003) .007 (.028) 
Market Value .035 (.019)* .059 (.016)*** .016 (.023) .025 (.036) 
Market to Book 
Ratio 









50 64 50 31 
Log-Likelihood -2612.059 -4049.312 -1928.471 -814.754 
Pseudo R2 .03 .05 .05 .04 




Covariate Balance for Target and Control Firms 
 R&D sample Advertising Sample SG&A Sample Tobin’s q Sample 
Variable Treat Control p>|t| Treat Control p>|t| Treat Control p>|t| Treat Control p>|t| 
ROA -.03 -.05 .79 .08 .08 .74 .05 -.02 .41 .05 .05 .53 
Market 
Value 
6.33 6.40 .74 6.36 6.37 .99 6.38 6.37 .95 6.33 6.37 .46 
M/B Ratio 1.87 1.98 .65 1.47 1.45 .84 1.43 1.58 .32 1.63 1.61 .55 
ROA 
Growth 
.002 .003 .84 .003 .004 .94 -.009 -.008 .47 -.01 -.04 .80 
R&D  .45 .43 .21       .42 .38 .42 
Advertising    .36 .35 .64    .34 .34 .89 
SG&A       .75 .76 .73 .83 .84 .70 
Tobin’s q          1.83 1.97 .39 
N 248 248  170 170  391 391  106 106  
 
 
Trends for R&D, SG&A, and advertising spending, and Tobin’s q for my four 
























































































I use a Difference-in-Difference (DIFF-IN-DIFF) approach to estimate the effects of 
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FIGURE 7 
Advertising Spending Trends for Targets and Controls 
FIGURE 8 




activist investors as the treatment group and the matched firms (found by propensity 
score matching) as control group. I examine the effects of activist investor intervention 
during the time period of two years before and two years after intervention.  
I estimate the following four equations: 
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where AD is advertising intensity, SGA is SG&A intensity, RD is R&D intensity, and 
TQ is the Tobin’s q of the firm. ACTIVIST is a dummy variable that denotes whether a 
firm has been a target of activist investors, or not. POST is a dummy variable which 
equals to one if the observation year is after the year which the activist intervention has 
happened (t+1 and t+2) and zero otherwise (For control group it depends on the activist 
intervention year in the matched target). CEOMKTG is CEO’s marketing experience. 
IMR is inverse mills ratio calculated from the probit selection model (Equation 1).IND is 
a vector of k-1 dummy variables representing different industries (SIC 2-digit). C is a 
vector of control variables I include in the model which include the number of 
employees, the CEO’s marketing experience, CEO tenure, revenue, and net income.  , 
 ,  , and   capture year fixed effects and  ,  ,  , and   are the error terms. Consistent 
with prior research (Dotzel and Shankar 2019; Dotzel, Shankar, and Berry 2013; Morgan 
and Rego 2006; Sorescu and Spanjol 2008), I lag some of the independent variables by a 
year to control for potential endogeneity. I include interactions in the TQ model as 





The results of the analysis for marketing intensity, innovation intensity and 
Tobin’s q appear in Table 17. Activist investor intervention has a significant negative 
impact (p < .05) on advertising intensity, supporting H1. However, the effect on SG&A 
intensity is not significant (p > .10). Activist investor intervention has a negative effect 
on R&D intensity (p < .01), lending support to H2. However, it does not have a 
significant direct effect on firm value (p > .10). Importantly, the CEO’s marketing 
experience mitigates the negative effect of activist investor on advertising intensity (p < 
.01), supporting H4. As in the case of advertising intensity, the CEO’s marketing 
experience also mitigates the negative effect of activist investor on R&D intensity (p < 
.01), supporting H5. It appears that activist investors view marketing and R&D intensity 
and spending as expenses and not as means to create valuable assets in the long-run. 
However, the CEO’s marketing experience does dampen the negative effects of activist 
investor intervention on marketing and R&D intensities. Because SG&A expenditures 
and R&D intensity directly drive firm value and because activist investor intervention 
has a negative effect on these variables, I conclude that activist investor intervention has 










Estimation Results for Intensity and Tobin’s q 
Dependent Variable SG&A Intensity Advertising 
Intensity 
R&D Intensity Tobin’s q 
Treat .031 (.021) .033 (.015)** .044 (.017)** -.011 (.151) 
Post .004 (.019) .012 (.015) .005 (.007) -.099 (.159) 
Treat × Post -.017 (.024) -.042 (.021)** -.030 (.008)*** .004 (.214) 
CEO’s Marketing 
Experience 
.053 (.012)*** .041 (.008)*** -.001 (.006) .038 (.088) 
Treat × CEO’s 
Marketing Experience 
-.041 (.017)** -.028 (.011)** -.009 (.008) -.044 (.116) 
Post × CEO’s Marketing 
Experience 
-.035 (.014)** -.028 (.012)** -.007 (.005) .026 (.115) 
Treat × Post × CEO’s 
Marketing Experience 
.032 (.021) .044 (.015)*** .016 (.006)*** .076 (.161) 
CEO’s Tenure -.004 (.007) -.014 (.005)*** .004 (.003) -.019 (.045) 
Number of Employees .008 (.005) .083 (.003)*** .031 (.005)*** .255 (.087)*** 
IMR .031 (.073) -.097 (.044)** -.144 (.061) -.921 (.676) 
R&D Intensity    .632 (.366)* 
SG&A Intensity    1.902 (.302)*** 
Advertising Intensity    -.132 (.302) 
Revenue    -.354 (.068)*** 
Profit    .141 (.025)*** 
Intercept .395 (.254) .593 (.144)*** .498 (.219)** 4.554 (2.063)** 
R-squared .14 .59 .61 .26 
N 3,128 1,360 1,984 848 
Notes: * p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01.  
 
 
The results for marketing and R&D expenditures appear in Table 18 and are 
similar to those in Table 17. Although activist investor intervention’s effect on SG&A 
intensity is insignificant, its effect on SG&A spending is negative and significant (p < 
.01). As in Table 17, the CEO’s marketing role ameliorates the negative effects of 
activist investor intervention on marketing and R&D spending. Thus, activist investor 
intervention has deleterious effects on marketing and R&D expenditures, but the CEO’s 







Estimation Results for Expenditures and Tobin’s q 







Treat .220 (.075)*** .122 (.122) .176 (.127) -.028 (.152) 
Post .021 (.020) .039 (.039) .093 (.033)*** -.055 (.160) 
Treat × Post -.082 (.019)*** -.077 (.038)** -.181 (.032)*** -.018 (.216) 
CEO’s marketing 
experience 
.019 (.017) .092 (.029)*** .015(.024) .042 (.089) 
Treat × CEO’s marketing 
experience 
-.035 (.022) -.054 (.038) -.078 (.033)** -.054 (.117) 
Post × CEO’s marketing 
experience 
-.003 (.011) -.057 (.021)*** -.048 (.019)** .030 (.117) 
Treat × Post × CEO’s 
marketing experience 
.026 (.016)* .074 (.029)** .102 (.026)*** .072 (.163) 
CEO’s Tenure .013 (.007)* -.004 (.013) .031 (.011)*** -.011 (.046) 
Number of employees .910 (.018)*** .941 (.032)*** .775 (.034)*** .148 (.092) 
IMR -.248 (.095)** .014 (.146) -.455 (.243)* -1.096 (.703) 
R&D expenditures    .014 (.054) 
SG&A expenditures    .616 (.113)*** 
Advertising expenditures    .061 (.048) 
Revenue    -.889 (.093)*** 
Profit    .148 (.025)*** 
Intercept 2.416 
(.748)*** 
2.36 (.665)*** 1.655 (1.19) 3.542 (.407)*** 
R-squared .78 .78 .69 .24 
N 3,128 1,360 1,984 848 




I conducted several robustness checks to ensure that my results are robust. First, I 
used additional variables in propensity score matching. These variables include the 
number of analysts following the stock of the firm, institutional ownership in the firm, 
buy-and-hold abnormal returns, and debt, consistent with Brav et al. (2008). The results 
remain consistent. Second, I used the CEO’s marketing background instead of the 
CEO’s marketing experience as a moderator. Again, the results are largely the same (the 
results appear in Tables 24 and 25 in the APPENDIX I). Third, I used firm fixed effects 




estimated the models using stepwise regression by sequentially adding interactions to the 
main model. The results are robust.  
 
IMPLICATIONS 
Findings of this research has important implications for both theory and 
managerial practice. From a theoretical perspective, this research contributes to the 
ongoing debates in finance, accounting, and management on the positive and negative 
effects of shareholder activism for firms. My findings shed light on how activist investor 
intervention can affect firm-level spending on marketing activities and innovation, and 
how it may ultimately affect firm value. While most of the literature in this area has been 
concerned with firm value and stock market returns (e.g., Brav et al. 2008), this research 
mainly focuses on how activist investor intervention may have an impact on marketing 
and innovation expenses. It also informs marketers about the dangers they may face after 
activist intervention. The findings indicate that activist investors are not the biggest fan 
of marketing activities of the firms and targeted firms experience a drop in marketing 
and R&D spending after activist intervention. Because advertising and R&D 
expenditures accrue immediately, unlike SG&A, they can be classified as strategic 
expenditures, so cutting these expenditures may boost firm value in the short-term but 
will likely hurt it in the long run. Therefore, it seems that activist investors prefer short 
term earnings to the long term ones. The period I have studied in this research also 
includes the growth and emergence of hedge funds. As argued by previous research 




investors and their effects may be more detrimental. By covering the period from 2010 
to 2015, my research addresses the limitations of prior research in this area.  
In addition to studying the main effects of activist investor intervention on firm-
level outcomes, my finding suggest that the CEO’s marketing experience can mitigate 
the negative effects of activist investor intervention on firm-level outcomes. As 
discussed earlier, activist investors may need the support of internal governance to 
implement their desired changes. They may get some pushback from internal 
governance, in particular, the CEO. Trian Fund’s attack on Dupont in 2014 and how 
Ellen Kullman, the then CEO of Dupont fought against Trian, can serve as an example 
of such scenarios (Gandel 2015). CEOs with marketing experience can give activist 
investors a hard time when they wish to cut marketing and R&D costs of the firm. Since 
marketing spending can have a long-term effect on firm financial performance, presence 
of a CEO with marketing experience can help firms fight activist demands and therefore 
prevents firm from poor long-term financial performance. This finding is in line with the 
findings of the first essay (Mirahmad and Shankar 2018), indicating that presence of 
marketing at corporate strategy level can have a positive impact on firm financial 
performance. Consistent with prior research (e.g., Dotzel, Shankar, and Berry 2013), I 
calculated the net effect of the CEO’s marketing experience at the mean for my 









Summary of the Effects of the CEO’s Marketing Experience on Different Outcomes in the 
Case of Activist Investor Intervention 
 
 
I control for selection by activist investors through a Heckman model. Much 
previous research in finance and accounting do not control for selection. Thus, my 
research builds on prior research in this area.  
The findings from this research have significant implications for managers and 
practitioners as well. The results show that activist investor intervention leads to reduced 
marketing and R&D spending by the target firm. This decision may hurt firm value in 
the long-term. To prevent erosion of long-run value, managers need to evaluate their 
firms like activist investors to avoid becoming an activist investor’s target. While it 
might not be always feasible for firms to avoid being targeted by activist investors, their 
managers need not be easily persuaded by activist investors and accept their demands 
unconditionally.  
The findings of this research indicate that the CEO’s marketing experience can 
mitigate the negative effects of activist investors on firm-level outcomes. As Coffee and 
Palia (2015) suggest, few companies seem immune from the reach of hedge fund 
activism. Seemingly, if a credible scenario can be offered to the market that breaking up 
a company will yield shareholder gains, activist funds will assemble to attack even those 
Dependent Variable Average CEO Marketing 
Experience 
Net Effect of CEO 
Marketing Experience at 
Mean 
Advertising intensity  .859 .014 
R&D intensity .800 .003 
SG&A intensity .711 .035 




companies with a long record of profitability. Because shareholder activism is becoming 
a common phenomenon, firms may be better off hiring or promoting a CEO with 
marketing experience. Firms may also want to expose their CEOs to more marketing 
issues so that he/she can help firms improve firm value.   
Finally, the results of this research have implications for public policy makers. 
There is an ongoing debate on how activist investors may positively or negatively affect 
firm performance and value. Some researchers have started asking how shareholder 
activism may have a negative effect on the future of different industries. Activist 
investor intervention may not only impact the expenditures of the target firm, but also 
those of their competitors (Coffee and Palia 2015). Firms may cut their R&D and 
marketing spending to avoid becoming a target for activist investors. This behavior may 
hurt not only the future value of the firm but also the future of the industry and 
eventually consumer welfare. The findings of this research suggest that activist investors 
cut R&D and marketing spending of firms. Because shareholder activism is growing, if 
too many firms are targeted by activists and if R&D spending levels are cut, there may 
not be many innovations in the market. Policy makers may want to consider making 
activist investor intervention harder and more costly so that innovativeness can survive 
and thrive in different industries.  
 
LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
My research has certain limitations that provide opportunities for further 
research. First, I examine activist interventions in the United States. The effects of 




activist investor campaigns may have different success rates in different continents 
(Becht at al. 2017). Second, I do not know much about the role of activist groups’ 
characteristics in the effects of intervention. Activist shareholder characteristics may 
have an impact on their choices of target firms and further actions. Third, to identify the 
causal effect, I excluded firms that were targeted by activists more than once during my 
period of data. It will be interesting to analyze the effects of multiple interventions on a 
target firm. Fourth, I did not analyze the differences in the effects of activist investor 
interventions between winning and losing campaigns. Future research can address this 
issue. Finally, other variables such as marketing capability, marketing department 

















CHAPTER IV  
CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation makes important contributions to both theory and managerial 
practice. First, from a theoretical perspective, this dissertation contributes to the 
marketing literature by offering new insights on the role of marketing at the corporate 
strategy level. The essays highlight the critical role that the CEO’s marketing experience 
plays, either as a main driver, or as a moderator when activist investors intervene, in firm 
strategic outcomes, including marketing and innovation intensity, and firm value. I find 
that the CEO’s marketing experience is a driver of marketing and R&D spending as well 
as firm value, and that it can also work as a defense mechanism against activist 
investors’ demands when these investors intervene in a firm. Second, from a managerial 
perspective, the findings from this dissertation help managers in their decisions 
regarding CEO selection and succession plans based on the firm strategy and industry 
competition, as well as their defense mechanisms when activist investors attack their 
firms. From a public policy standpoint, the findings shed light on the negative effects of 
activist investor intervention on innovation and marketing spending of the firms, and 
urge public policy makers to come up with stricter regulations and policies to protect 
innovation in the society from the potential detrimental effects of activist investors.  
In my first essay, I find that the CEO’s marketing experience has a positive effect 
on marketing and R&D intensity, and firm value. This finding suggest that all things 
equal, firms are better off selecting CEOs with a strong marketing experience. However, 




experience is weakened. If firms are looking for ways to encourage CEOs with 
marketing experience, they need to go beyond stock-based compensation. I also find that 
industry competition strengthens the effects of the CEO’s marketing experience on firm 
outcomes. This finding suggests that CEOs with marketing experience can be more 
effective in industries with fierce competition. 
In my second essay, I find that activist investor intervention has a negative direct 
effect on marketing and innovation intensity, and a negative indirect effect through 
marketing and innovation intensity on firm value. These findings suggest that managers 
need to evaluate their firms like an activist investor to avoid becoming an activist 
investor’s target. The results of the second essay also show that the CEO’s marketing 
experience weakens the negative effects of activist investor intervention on firm 
outcomes. While avoiding activist investors may not always be an option, by hiring a 
CEO with marketing experience, the board of directors can mitigate the negative effects 
of activist investor intervention on firm outcomes.  
Overall, the findings of the two essays shed light on how the role of marketing at 
the corporate strategy level, in particular, in form of the CEO’s marketing experience, 
can benefit the firms. Firms led by CEOs with marketing experience are more 
innovative, spend more in marketing, and perform better financially than those led by 
CEOs without marketing experience. In addition, in case of activist investor 
intervention, the detrimental effects of the intervention on innovation, marketing 
intensity and firm value will be minimized when a CEO with marketing experience is at 
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 Focal Variables  
Intercept -.138 (14.968) 6.497 (9.158) 
CEO’s Marketing Backgrounda -1.348 (.485)*** .822 (.431)* 
R&D Intensity  7.713 (2.470)*** .939 (1.076) 
CEO and Management Level Controls 
CEO’s Age  1.914 (.677)*** -.905 (.540)* 
CEO’s Duality  .458 (.137)*** -.225 (.107)** 
CEO’s Tenure -.355 (.097)*** .016 (.069) 
CEO’s Total Experience -.373 (.374) .808 (.247)*** 
CEO’s Engineering Backgrounda .413 (.145)*** .294 (.137)** 
CEO’s Experience within Firm  .218 (.072)*** .058 (.064) 
CEO’s Ownership Share .007 (.032) .073 (.024)*** 
CEO’s Compensation Ratio -.529 (.495) -.700 (.376)* 
CEO’s Gender  .551 (.238)** .626 (.173)*** 
CMO’s Presence in TMT -.367 (.157)** -.244 (.111)** 
COO’s Presence in TMT -.172 (.112) -.231 (.087)*** 
Marketing Department Power  .011 (.004)*** .001 (.003) 
Firm and Industry Level Controls 
Firm Age  -.282 (.091)*** -.153 (.065)** 
Number of Employees  .573 (.073)*** .558 (.051)*** 
Market Size  -.484 (1.093) -.343 (.655) 
Market Growth  1.710 (1.101) .471 (.676) 
Market Share 6.171 (1.345)*** -3.707 (.703)*** 
Industry Concentration .270 (6.985) 1.665 (3.912) 
Financial Leverage .589 (.624) -.634 (.369)* 
Effort Intensity .247 (.482) -.587 (.444) 
Organizational Slack 1.421 (1.003) 1.226 (.825) 
CEO’s Marketing Background × CEO 
Ownership Share 
.164 (.043)*** -.042 (.039) 
CEO’s Marketing  Background × 
Industry Concentration 
-.031 (1.783) -2.516 (.821)*** 
Model Fit Statisticsb Log-likelihood = -3348.06 
χ2 =1120.90; p < .01. 
Log-likelihood = -3158.84 
χ2 =527.11; p < .01. 
Notes: *p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. Sample size = 879 
a Background is operationalized as a dummy variable. 





Estimation Results of R&D Intensity, SG&A Intensity, Advertising Intensity, and Firm 














Intercept -.091 (.222) 2.559 (.962)*** .165 (.283) 1.445 (1.746) 
CEO’s Marketing 
Backgrounda 
.048 (.011)*** -.047 (.048) .025 (.014)* 
.237 (.090)*** 
R&D Intensity    1.170 (.265)*** 
Advertising Intensity    .262 (.236) 
SGA Intensity    .647 (.074)*** 
PATENT     .011 (.006)* 
TRADEMARK    .011 (.007) 
CEO and Management Level Controls 
CEO’s Age  .023 (.014)* -.095 (.043)** -.011 (.013) -.256 (.111)** 
CEO’s Duality -.003 (.002) .005 (.010) -.004 (.003) -.003 (.019) 
CEO’s Tenure  -.003 (.002)* .007 (.007) -.001 (.002) .023 (.013)* 
CEO’s Total Experience  -.022 (.006)***   -.068 (.049) 
CEO’s Engineering 
Backgrounda 
.029 (.004)*** .008 (.017) -.009 (.005)* -.014 (.034) 
CEO’s Finance Backgrounda  .014 (.019) -.003 (.006) -.111 (.036)*** 
CEO’s Operations 
Backgrounda 
 .012 (.015) -.006 (.005) 
-.016 (.029) 
CEO’s Law Backgrounda  -.085 (.026)*** -.016 (.008)** .075 (.049) 
CEO’s Experience within 
Firm 
.002 (.002) -.028 (.007)*** -.003 (.002)* .005 (.012) 
CEO’s Ownership Share  .003 (.001)*** -.006 (.003)** -.0004 (.001) .019 (.005)*** 
CEO’s Compensation Ratio .009 (.007) .004 (.034) -.022 (.010)** .180 (.074)** 
CEO’s Compensation    -.025 (.008)*** 
CEO’s Gender .012 (.005)*** -.052 (.020)*** .005 (.006) -.010 (.037) 
CMO’s Presence in TMT .011 (.003)*** .020 (.011)* -.007 (.003)** -.035 (.020)* 
Marketing Department Power -.0003 (.0001)*** -.001 (.0003)*** .0000 (.0001) .002 (.0005)*** 
COO’s Presence in TMT .004 (.002)* .010 (.009) .004 (.003) .027 (.017)* 
Firm and Industry Level Controls 
Firm Age  -.003 (.002)* .019 (.007)*** .003 (.002) .003 (.011) 
Number of Employees -.005 (.001)*** -.017 (.005)*** .001 (.002) -.025 (.015) 
Market Size  .008 (.016) -.125 (.070)* -.004 (.020) .036 (.125) 
Market Growth -.013 (.017) .044 (.074) .005 (.022) .116 (.132) 
Market Share .055 (.018)*** -.034 (.079) -.060 (.023)** .384 (.153)** 
Industry Concentration .082 (.092) .134 (.398) -.021 (.117) -.061 (.716) 
Financial Leverage -.037 (.008)***    
Effort Intensity  -.059 (.008)*** -.217 (.036)*** -.034 (.010)***  
Organizational Slack .004 (.017) .321 (.071)*** .037 (.021)*  
Profit    .038 (.004)*** 
Revenue    -.039 (.018)** 
CEO’s Marketing 
Background × CEO 
Ownership Share 
-.004 (.001)*** -.142 (.080)* -.001 (.001) -.015 (.008)* 
CEO’s Marketing  
Background × Industry 
Concentration 
-.013 (.018) .011 (.005)** -.044 (.023)* -.203 (.147) 
R-Square .61 .56 .29 .49 
Notes: *p < .10. ** p < .05. *** p < .01. Notes:  Sample size = 879 












 Focal Variables  
Intercept 5.653 (15.196) 7.660 (9.305) 
CEO’s Marketing Experience a  -2.194 (.475)*** .134 (.375) 
CEO’s Sales Experience a -.054 (.088) .004 (.061) 
R&D Intensity  7.612 (2.467)*** 2.002 (1.109)* 
CEO and Management Level Controls 
CEO’s Age  1.183 (.720) -1.323 (.563)** 
CEO’s Duality  .385 (.146)*** -.235 (.109)** 
CEO’s Tenure  -.340 (.100)*** .037 (.071) 
CEO’s Total Experience  .150 (.398) .886 (.259)*** 
CEO’s Experience within Firm  .142 (.078)* .086 (.066) 
CEO’s Engineering Experience  .232 (.058)*** -.004 (.049) 
CEO’s Ownership Share  -.128 (.051)** .062 (.035)* 
CEO’s Compensation Ratio  -.149 (.501) -.694 (.376)* 
CEO’s Gender .235 (.273) .548 (.210)*** 
CMO’s Presence in TMT -.227 (.163) -.260 (.115)** 
COO’s Presence in TMT -.140 (.114) -.218 (.088)** 
Marketing Department Power .009 (.004)** .001 (.003) 
Firm and Industry Level Controls 
Firm Age -.169 (.104) -.133 (.069)* 
Number of Employees  .572 (.075)*** .576 (.050)*** 
Market Size -.703 (1.106) -.273 (.680) 
Market Growth  1.803 (1.088)* .411 (.692) 
Market Share 5.961 (1.407)*** -3.543 (.695)*** 
Industry Concentration 2.272 (7.228) .586 (4.041) 
Financial Leverage  .426 (.645) -.633 (.374)* 
Organizational Slack  1.722 (1.021)* 1.234 (.847) 
Effort Intensity  .386 (.510) -.815 (.472)* 
Interactions 
CEO’s Marketing Experience × 
Industry Concentration 
1.833 (1.543) -.476 (.941) 
CEO’s Marketing Experience × 
CEO’s Ownership Share 
.183 (.040)*** -.008 (.032) 
Model Fit Statistics  
Log-likelihood = -3342.81 
χ2 =1131.41; p < .01. 
Log-likelihood = -3165.11 
χ2 = 514.58; p < .01.  







Estimation Results of R&D Intensity, SG&A Intensity, Advertising Intensity, and Firm 














Intercept -.183 (.229) 1.705 (.997)* -.120 (.286) 1.308 (1.779) 
CEO’s Marketing Experience  .042 (.009)*** .100 (.039)** .021 (.011)* .191 (.071)*** 
CEO’s Sales Experience  -.002 (.001)* .0002 (.005) -.003 (.002)** .024 (.010)** 
R&D Intensity    1.460 (.259)*** 
Advertising Intensity    .459 (.239)* 
SGA Intensity    .570 (.074)*** 
PATENT     .012 (.007)* 
TRADEMARK    .016 (.007)** 
CEO and Management Level Controls 
CEO’s Age  .013 (.014) -.099 (.051)* -.003 (.015) -.198 (.111)* 
CEO’s Duality -.004 (.002)* .001 (.011) -.006 (.003)* .008 (.019) 
CEO’s Tenure -.003 (.002) .007 (.007) -.0002 (.002) .026 (.013)** 
CEO’s Total Experience  -.017 (.006)***   -.031 (.059) 
CEO’s Engineering 
Experience  
.007 (.001)*** -.005 (.006) -.008 (.002)*** 
-.010 (.013) 
CEO’s Other Experience   -.004 (.015) -.009 (.005)* -.025 (.034) 
CEO’s Experience within 
Firm 
.003 (.002)* -.027 (.007)*** -.003 (.002)* .0003 (.012) 
CEO’s Ownership Share .005 (.001)*** .001 (.004) .0003 (.001) .026 (.007)*** 
CEO’s Compensation Ratio  .008 (.008) .010 (.034) -.020 (.010)** .178 (.074)** 
CEO’s Compensation    -.0275 
(.008)*** 
CEO’s Gender .011 (.005)** -.038 (.023) .005 (.007) .040 (.042) 
CMO’s Presence in TMT .011 (.003)*** .024 (.011)** -.007 (.003)** -.030 (.021) 
Marketing Department Power -.0004 (.0007) -.001 (.0003)*** .0000 (.0000) .003 (.001)*** 
COO’s Presence in TMT  .003 (.002) .012 (.009) .004 (.003)* .021 (.017) 
Firm and Industry Level Controls 
Firm Age -.002 (.002) .015 (.007) .004 (.002)* -.012 (.012) 
Number of Employees -.006 (.001)*** -.015 (.005)*** .001 (.001) -.014 (.015) 
Market Size  .015 (.017) -.069 (.073) .015 (.021) .024 (.129) 
Market Growth -.015 (.017) .011 (.075) -.004 (.022) .128 (.133) 
Market Share .050 (.018)*** -.110 (.081) -.083 (.023)*** .519 (.156)*** 
Industry Concentration  .081 (.093) .209 (.408) -.013 (.117) .090 (.725) 
Effort Intensity  -.066 (.008)*** -.237 (.035)*** -.036 (.010)***  
Organizational Slack .014 (.017) .301 (.072)*** .044 (.021)**  
Financial Leverage  -.044 (.009)***    
Profit    .038 (.005)*** 
Revenue     -.057 (.018)*** 
Interactions 
CEO’s Marketing Experience 
× CEO’s Ownership Share 
-.004 (.001)*** -.004 (.004) -.001 (.001) -.011 (.006)* 
CEO’s Marketing Experience 
× Industry Concentration  
-.044 (.019)** -.259 (.083)*** -.090 (.024)*** -.041 (.150) 
R-Square .60 .55 .31 .49 






Estimation Results for Intensities and Tobin’s Q with CEO’s Marketing Background 
Dependent Variable SG&A Intensity Advertising 
Intensity 
R&D Intensity Tobin’s q 
Treat .034 (.019)* .029 (.012)** .043 (.017)** -.003 (.131) 
Post -.001 (.018) .005 (.013) .001 (.007) -.061 (.141) 
Treat × Post -.015 (.022) -.032 (.018)* -.020 (.006)*** .007 (.184) 
CEO’s Marketing 
Background 
.221 (.035)*** .135 (.024)*** .024 (.015) .421 (.245)* 
Treat × CEO’s Marketing 
Background 
-.208 (.047)*** -.127 (.031)*** -.035 (.020)* -.326 (.318) 
Post × CEO’s Marketing 
Background 
-.134 (.041)*** -.102 (.032)*** -.008 (.012) -.165 (.321) 
Treat × Post × CEO’s 
Marketing Background 
.136 (.055)** .148 (.041)*** .021 (.016) .400 (.428) 
CEO’s Tenure -.004 (.007) -.014 (.004)*** .005 (.003)* -.013 (.045) 
Number of Employees .009 (.005)* .083 (.003)*** .032 (.005)*** .259 (.087)*** 
IMR .041 (.074) -.101 (.044)** -.145 (.061)** -.839 (.675) 
R&D Intensity    .653 (.362)* 
SG&A Intensity    1.868 
(.302)*** 
Advertising Intensity    -.124 (.300) 
Revenue    -.356 
(.067)*** 
Profit    .137 (.024)*** 
Intercept .396 (.255) .633 (.144)*** .495 (.220)** 4.287 
(2.048)** 
R-squared .14 .59 .60 .27 
N 3,128 1,360 1,984 848 















Estimation Results for Expenditures and Tobin’s q with CEO’s Marketing Background 







Treat .205 (.073)*** .118 (.119) .150 (.124) -.007 (.131) 
Post .021 (.019) .024 (036) .066 (.031)** -.008 (.142) 
Treat × Post -.075 (.017)*** -.057 (.032)* -.126 (.027)*** -.023 (.185) 
CEO’s Marketing 
Background 
.024 (.045) .294 (.083)*** .138 (.065)** .532 (.247)** 
Treat × CEO’s 
Marketing Background 
-.063 (.061) -.261 (.103)** -.226 (.086)*** -.453 (.321) 
Post × CEO’s 
Marketing Background 
-.009 (.031) -.202 (.061)*** -.071 (.052) -.218 (.323) 
Treat × Post × CEO’s 
Marketing Background 
.068 (.042)* .249 (.077)*** .166 (.069)** .459 (.433) 
CEO’s Tenure .012 (.007)* -.005 (.014) .036 (.011)*** -.004 (.045) 
Number of Employees .924 (.018)*** .939 (.032)*** .776 (.034)*** .150 (.092) 
IMR -.243 (.095)** .016 (.146) -.449 (.244)* -.939 (.701) 
R&D Expenditure    .009 (.053) 




   .052 (.048) 
Revenue    -.889 
(.091)*** 
Profit    .146 
(.025)*** 
Intercept 2.408 (.749)*** 2.008 (.758)*** 1.611 (1.193) 6.279 
(2.119)*** 
R-squared .78 .78 .69 .25 
N 3,128 1,360 1,984 848 




































Matching Graphs for R&D Sample 
FIGURE 10 



























Matching Graphs for Advertising Sample 
FIGURE 12 






MARKETING JOB TITLES 
 
 
Titles of Jobs/Positions Categorized as Marketing Positions 
 
President  
President of marketing, President of merchandising, Chief marketing officer, Chief 
merchandising officer, Chief customer officer, Chief communication officer, Chief 
commercial officer, Chief brand Officer, Chief growth officer, Chief development officer. 
 
EVP, SVP, VP of   
Marketing, merchandising, communication, corporate development, business development, 
customer experience, customer service, corporate marketing, worldwide marketing, display 
marketing, marketing operations, brand, branding operations, brand management, brand 
development, store brands, global brands, brand operations, advertising, public affairs, 
corporate affairs, public relations, corporate relations, customer insights, customer 
operations, customer relationship management, customer group, customer development, 
product/market development, product management, product operations, dealer relations, 
retail. 
 
Mid and Low-level Positions 
Brand manager, advertising manager, marketing manager, assistant to the advertising 
manager, advertising assistant, branding assistant, product manager, product development 
manager, regional marketing manager, marketing positions, manager of customer groups, 
customer service manager, customer experience manager, customer expert, marketing 
trainee, advertising trainee, service manager, merchandising manager, branded product 
packaging manager, branding trainee, marketing and advertising positions. 
 
Some jobs include combined titles such as marketing and strategy, marketing and 
merchandising, and advertising and branding. 
 
